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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to examine farms' dependence on federal United 
States agricultural subsidies in Iowa and Tennessee. As subsidies and their distribution 
are continually debated, this research considers the effects on farm enterprises if 
subsidies had not been distributed in 1996, 2000, and 2003. This is achieved by first 
developing a classification system for farm enterprises in the two states. The 
classification system that is used segregates farms into modal groups based on land 
ownership arrangement and solvency class. Quartiles are used to differentiate land 
ownership arrangement (i.e. the percentage of operated land owned). Four solvency 
classes are defined, based on the interaction between net farm income and debt-to-asset 
ratio, as determined by the Agricultural Resource Management Survey. 
After the data are segregated by land ownership arrangement and solvency class, 
the resulting distribution of farm operations is analyzed. The study then investigates how 
the distribution of farms among the classification categories would change if annual 
government payments are subtracted from net farm income. To accomplish this, 
government payments are first subtracted from net farm income to create a new net farm 
income; then each farm was assigned a new solvency class based on the new net farm 
income. After the new data were compiled, a comparison was done between data that 
include government payments and data that do not include government payments. 
The study found that the absence of farm subsidies did not have a large effect on 
structural and financial characteristics of farms in 1996 and 2003. Specifically, in 1996 if 
government payment had not been distributed in Iowa, 9.5 percent of farms in solvency 
class I (positive net farm income and debt-to-asset ratio less than 0.40) would have 
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shifted to solvency class II (negative net fann income and debt-to-asset ratio of below 
0.40). In Tennessee, in 2003, a similar shift would have occurred to only 1 % of fanns in 
solvency class I. However, in 2000, the year in the study in which the largest amount of 
subsidies was distributed, the absence of them affected the distribution of farms by 
structural and financial characteristics dramatically. In many cases, especially in Iowa, 
the subsidies represented the difference in negative and positive net farm. incomes. For 
instance, a 28% shift from solvency class I to solvency class II would have taken place in 
Iowa. 
In conclusion, the study shows that although farm subsidies may not be a major 
factor in the financial health of the farm sector in some years; in other years the payments 
are crucial to the financial well being of the businesses that make up the industry. The 
study makes no judgments concerning the use of farm subsidies; it merely depicts the 
structure and financial characteristics of farms in Iowa and Tennessee in their presence 
and absence. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
The United States has the most productive and diverse agricultural industry in the 
world. The federal government has provided monetary aid to the sector since the 1930s. 
The distribution of agricultural-subsidies has been a highly contentious issue recently, 
and the issue has become so prevalent that it surfaces in the mainstream media on a 
regular basis. · Critics have even gone as far as attributing terrorism as partially the result 
of U. S. farm subsidies keeping world prices down, which in turn makes farmers in third 
world countries so miserably poor that they feel terrorism is the only way to have their 
message heard (Thurow and Kilman 2002). On the other side, some believe that subsidy 
programs are the very reason the industry has been so successful, citing that subsidies 
control price fluctuations, which allow room for the innovative risk taking that has 
allowed technology in the industry to soar (Boulding 1983). This study is not designed to 
justify the use nor the historical impact of United States government subsidies; rather it 
assumes that government payments are already in place and attempts to reveal their role 
in farm incomes and solvencies. 
Problem and Obiectives 
In order to better understand the role of government payments in American 
agriculture, it is necessary to first understand the methods by which they are distributed, 
and then to understand the relationship of payments to farms. The next section discusses 
the various types of subsidies currently in place. The remainder of the study attempts to 
gain insight regarding the relationship between farm financial vulnerability and 
agricultural subsidies. In order to accomplish this, a classification system of farms is 
developed that considers the characteristics of farms that are affected by the government 
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subsidies, and then measure the changes that would take place if government payments 
were eliminated. 
Most government subsidies to agriculture are awarded to producers on the basis of 
current prices, and/or what and how much they produce either currently or historically. 
By design, payments to producers are generally derived from nationallyiuniform, 
predetermined formulas, and their variation is due to current prices and units of 
production,·sometimes adjusted regionally. These payments do not take into account 
other measures that may· be determining factors of the operators' financial health, such as 
solvency or net farm income. Understanding how these characteristics are affected by 
subsidies will provide a better understanding of the role of the subsidies in farm 
enterprises. 
The goal of this study is to better understand the role of government subsidies in 
the farm sector in Iowa and Tennessee., Three objectives are identified to meet this goal. 
First, developing a classification system that considers structural characteristics and 
economic indicators is necessary. Second, an analysis of farm structure and subsidy 
distribution based on the new classification system will depict farm characteristics 
associated with the classification. Third, a comparison is made between farm · 
distribution, by financial and structural characteristics, in the presence and absence of 
subsidies. 
Discussion of Subsidies 
Currently, government subsidies in the United States are distributed according to 
several conditions. These conditions generally include product produced, market prices, 
current and/or historical production, and the amount of land taken out of production. The 
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payments are authorized, funded, and distributed through several federal programs. 
These programs include (but are not limited to) marketing assistanc� loans, loan 
. deficiency payments, production flexibility contracts, direct payments, countercyclical 
payment payments, emergency and supplemental assistance payments, Conservation 
Reserve program payments, and Conservation Security Program payments. 
Marketing assistance loans are distributed by the Commodity Credit Corporation 
(CCC), an entity within the United States Department of Agriculture. These loans are 
considered "nonrecourse", and available to producers of com, cotton, wheat, soybeans, 
rice, grain sorghum, oats, barley, and peanuts. Producers of these crops can take out · 
· loans, using their harvested crops as collateral, provided that the crops are stored in a 
government approved facility. The amount of the loan is based on a per unit loan rate 
established nationally either annually, or by the preceding farm bill, depending on the 
crop. The 2002 farm bill set loan rates for all program crops for the years 2002-2007. 
The life of the loan in most cases is nine months, and a stipulation exists that requires the 
product to be stored in a government approved facility. Marketing assistance loans can 
be satisfied in one of three ways. The first is to repay the loan at any time prior to 
maturity including applicable, accrued interest, which is one percent higher than the rate 
that treasury secured the loan to the CCC. The second way to repay the loan is to repay it 
at the alternative loan rate. The alternative loan rate is related to the posted county price 
for com, soybeans, wheat, oats, grain sorghum, oats and barley, and the prevailing world 
price for rice and upland cotton. County prices are posted daily and world prices weekly. 
If the alternative loan rate. is lower than the national loan rate, the farmer can elect to 
repay the loan at the alternative rate, in which case interest on the original loan is voided. 
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In such cases, the difference between the initial loan repayment including interest accrued 
and the alternative rate is called a marketing loru,i ·gain. The third alternative to satisfy a 
. market assistance loan is to simply forfeit the commodity held as collateral at loan 
maturity. As with the second option, interest is waived upon forfeiture in this instance. 
This alternative is the embodiment of the term nonrecourse, as there is no penalty 
associated with forfeiture of the collateral. 
Loan deficiency payments are underpinned by the same ideology as marketing 
assistance loans, except the producer does not have to enter into a loan with the 
government to realize them. These payments are calculated by taking the difference 
between the annual loan rate and the posted county price when the former is higher. 
Loan deficiency payments can be taken any time; and as the county price is posted daily, 
there is risk associated. Crops used for loan deficiency payments immediately become 
ineligible for marketing assistance loans. Both marketing assistance loans and loan 
deficiency payments are subject to limitations of $75,000 per crop per year; and the three 
entity rule is in effect which stipulates that no single farmer can receive more than one 
full payment from one crop and two half payments for additional crops. 
Production flexibility contracts were introduced in 1996 in the Federal 
Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996. The resulting payments are 
decoupled from production in that they are autonomous of what is produced; rather, they 
consider the land on which the eligible crop was produced in the past. Eligible crops 
included com, wheat, upland cotton, rice, grain sorghum, barley, and oats. In order to 
receive these payments, producers entered into contracts with the government in 1996. 
The land historically used to produce eligible crops determined base acreage. Upon 
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determination of base acreage, the government agreed to pay the farmer a sum equal to 
the product of the associated payment rate for the commodity, payment yield, and 85% of 
the base acreage. Production flexibility payments were paid in every . year of the contract 
irrespective of production decisions or market conditions. 
In 2002, The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act altered and renamed 
production flexibility contracts. The new name is direct payments, and their scope was 
broadened to include soybe�s, peanuts, and previously excluded oilseeds. These 
payments are calculated in the same manner as production flexibility contracts, with 
updated payment rates and the opportunity for farmers to update base acreage and 
program yield, under certain conditions. 
The year 2002 also saw the introduction of counter cyclical payments. These 
payments are aimed at adjusting support levels for producers based on current market 
conditions, and employ target pricing. Countercyclical payments are calculated by 
several variables, only one of which is fixed (target price). To find the countercyclical 
payment rate, both the commodity price and the national loan rate are considered. 
Whichever of these is higher is added to the previously calculated direct payment rate for 
the associated commodity. This number is then subtracted from the target price to 
determine the payment rate. After the payment rate is calculated, the countercyclical 
payment can be derived as the product of 85% of the base acreage, the payment yield for 
the commodity, and the payment rate for the commodity. Countercyclical payments are 
not issued every year. Only when market prices are sufficiently low do the payments 
become effective. 
5 
Emergency and supplemental payments are another form of direct payments, but 
they are issued for different reasons. These reasons include offsetting financial strain 
caused by low prices, natural disasters, and severe weather that affects yields and prices. 
These payments are considered ad hoc and are authorized and implemented by Congress. 
Although these payments are considered ad hoc, they have become common since 1998, 
being paid in every year for a multitude of reasons and to farmers producing a variety of 
products (e.g. dairy in 2000, apples in 2002, and sugar beets in 2003), not just traditional 
program crops. 
The Conservation Reserve Program was implemented for two reasons. This 
program pays farmers to let land lay fallow for a certain amount of time (usually ten 
years). Although not always the case, the land taken out of production is generally 
targeted to land with questionable environmental integrity ( e.g. highly erodible) . . The 
first reason for implementation is to protect the land from erosion or other environmental 
degradation. The second reason is to help control the supply of commodities entering the 
market (ERS 2005a). The distribution of payments in the years 1996-2004 is detailed in 
figure 1. 
Subsidy Distribution 
Most analyses concerning government payments are done within the typological 
framework set forth in 2000 by the Economic Research Service (ERS), a branch of the 
United �tates Department of Agriculture. This typology segregates farms according to 
four criteria at most. All four criteria are not used for every category; neither do all 
categories employ four criteria. Table 1 depicts the entire typology as published by ERS 
(2000). 
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Figure 1. Distribution of fann payments by program, 1996-2004 
Table 1. ERS fann typoloj?;,, (ERS 2000) 
Small Family Fanns Sales of less than $250,000 per year 
Small fanns with gross sales of less than $100,000 per 
Limited Resource year, less than $150,000 in assets, and total fanning 
income of less than $20,000 
Retirement Small fanns whose operators report that they are retired 
Residential/Lifestyle Small fanns whose operators report a major occupation other than farming 
Farming Occupation Small fanns with sales less than $100,000 whose operators 
Lower Sales report farming as their major occupation 
Fanning Occupation Small fanns with gross sales between $100,000 and 
Higher Sales $249,999 whose operators report farming as their major occupation. 
Other Farms Fanns with sales of $250,000 or more per year 
Large Family Farms Farms with sales between $250,000 and $499,999 per year 
Very Large Family Farms with sales of $500,000 or more Farms 
Nonfamily Farms Fanns organized as nonfamily corporations or cooperatives, as well as fanns operated by hired managers. 
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Over the past eight years, the largest share of direct government farm payments 
has gone to commercial farms, as they are defined by ERS. Commercial farms are part of 
a secondary classification that was also developed by ERS. The collapsed typology used 
in the figure is a condensed version of the commonly used- eight-category typology. The 
rural residence category in the collapsed version represents limited resource, retirement, 
. and residential/lifestyle farms. The intermediate category represents both low and high 
sales farming occupation categories, and the commercial category captures large and very 
large family farms as well as nonfamily farms. Distribution of farm subsidies by 
collapsed typology is presented in figure 2. 
A look at the percentage of farm numbers compared to the percentage of total 
output by the collapsed typology shows that the highest portion of American farms are 
rural residence farms while the bulk of the production comes from commercial farms 
(Figure J). Another helpful visualization is one that shows how much government 
payments contribute to gross farm income. Figure 3 depicts this for the years between 
1996 and 2003. 
Consideration of Figures 2, 3, and 4 reveals that although commercial farms 
receive the highest portion of government payments, they represent the minority of farms, 
the majority of production, and the payments they do receive contribute the least of all to 
corresponding net farm income. Are these farms less reliant on the payments? With 
available data, it is difficult to observe much about these farms other than the fact that 
they account for most of the production in the country, they receive the greatest share of 
the subsidies, and that most of these farms receive them 
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In figure 5, the same data are presented, except gross farm income is replaced 
with net farm income. It is apparent that government payments account for a large 
portion of net farm income, especially in the rural residence and intermediate farm 
categories(ERS,2005b ). 
Although the academic literature is rich with investigations of the structure of the 
American farm based on a variety of parameters ( e.g. gross sales, operator' s on farm 
labor, size of operation), little effort has been made to investigate the relationships 
between government payments and the characteristics of the farms receiving them. The 
analyses that are available concerning government payment distribution utilize 
classification systems created a priori (ERS 2005b ). Because of this, many of these 
studies present the distribution of the subsidies as skewed and disproportionate. The 
reason for this is that most analyses employ data from the whole farm sector when 
investigating farm subsidy distribution as opposed to including_ only those farms that are 
eligible or actually receive payments. 
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There exists a need to better understand the structure of farms in relation to the amount of 
government aid they receive. To achieve this requires a classification system tailored to 
the needs of the study that considers factors that both influence and are influenced by 
government payments. 
The goal of most classification systems for agriculture is to segregate farms, 
based on the objectives of the creator, into groups that are homogeneous within and 
heterogeneous across groups. Again, variables of interest are chosen to meet the needs of 
the study. This study is aimed at understanding the structure of farms as it relates to 
government payments. It is true that, by design of government subsidy programs, most 
subsidies are paid to farmers producing com, cotton, soybeans, wheat, rice, grain 
sorghum, oats, barley, and peanuts. Important information that is still unknown about 
these operations relates to questions involving the role that the payments play in the farm 
balance sheets and income statements. For instance, what portion of net farm income do 
the payments make up? What would happen if farm subsidies were terminated? The 
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answer·s to these questions are · important to policy makers in the future, as they provide 
· insight into the reliance of these farms on crop subsidies. 
Because government suhsidies so heavily influence the bottom line of the income 
statement for American farms ( as Figure 4 shows) understanding the interrelationships of 
structural traits of farm businesses among homogeneous groups will help policy decision 
makers, analysts, and producers in the future better understand the role that these 
payments play in the decision making and organizational structure of American farms. 
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Chapter II: Related Literature 
Critics of the current system of subsidy distribution are numerous. One example 
is summarized in the publications, statements, and work of the Environmental Working 
. . 
. Group. They contend that farm subsidies are unnecessary and that. their distribution is 
extremely skewed in favor of large operations. They state that almost three quarters of 
· subsidies are distributed to only ten percent of producers (Environmental Working Group 
(2005). What they fail to mention is the aggregate contribution of these producers to the 
market._ Looking back at Figure 2 shows that the very farms that receive three quarters of 
· the payments also produce about 70% of total production (ERS 2005b ). 
In order to better evaluate the distribution and role of farm subsidies in the 
structural and financial characteristics off arms, it is necessary to categorize farm 
enterprises in a manner that highlights those characteristics, then consider data 
concerning farm subsidy distribution based on the classification system. 
Two subgroups of literature are necessary to encompass the scope of the study. 
The first considers previous classification systems used by policy analysts over the past 
century, while the second investigates the data used to derive these classifications. Some 
studies incorporate both groups, and will be reviewed as such, while others acknowledge 
only the data considerations associated with classification systems. 
Previous Classification Systems 
- Farm classification is not new. Systems with which to establish homogeneous 
groups of farm enterprises date back to the turn of the 20th century, when data from the 
Census Bureau were used. These classification systems relied primarily on size, value of 
products produced, and type of product. The first highly regarded study on the subject 
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was published in 1944, in the Journal of Fann Economics. In the article "Need for A 
New Classification of Farms", Benedict - et al. suggest that previous attempts by the 
Census Btireau and Department of Agriculture to classify farms were merely intended to 
increase the general knowledge of the sector instead of classifying farms for an intended 
purpose. · 1t was not until the 1920s that demand for more specific data on fanns arose. 
The authors note in 1944 that "what is particularly needed is a segregation of farms into a 
few simple, distinct, and clearly recognizable classes, and a tabulation for each of these 
classes of such data as are needed for recognizing and understanding the problems 
relating to them" (Benedict et al. 1944.). In order to do this, the authors felt that the 
parameters of the classification should differentiate by interests, behavior, and structure, 
depending on current conditions. 
Benedict et al. go on to foil the traditional idea of the "average American farm" 
_ by stating that the diversity of the sector and conditions under which it operates make the 
idea naive� They contend that national, omnibus farm programs tend to give some fanns 
undue advantages, while leaving others without the aid that they need. The authors 
assimilate this approach to a shotgun technique that never meets intended goals. 
The authors also recognize that there is no set group of measurements that can be 
used to identify and classify farms, and that any system of classification must be left to 
discretion; and the measurements used should be chosen to meet the intended goal. 
While they understand this, the authors note that "some sort of compromise must 
therefore be made between the ideal of a highly detailed and realistic grouping and the 
very broad classifications which are now so generally used in public discussion" 
(Benedict et al. 1944, 698-99). 
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In their classification system, Benedict et al. use a system of breaking points to 
identify natural groups of farms. The measurement used by the authors is gross value of 
products. They identify five groups in their system that include: 1) Large-scale farms and 
plantations; 2) Family-commercial farms; 3) Part time farms; 4) Residential farms; and 5) 
Small scale farms. This study laid the ground work for many future studies, and even the 
present day typology used by the Economic Research Service of the United States 
Department of Agriculture looks similar to this early classification system. 
Since 1944, vast research has both expanded on and refuted Benedict et al. Two 
papers written in 1965 do both. All three studies agree that there must be some way to 
classify farms in order to study them; yet all three recognize that, in accordance with 
Benedict et al., the measurements used must suit the investigation. This literature 
primarily involves the economic classification of farms that was developed jointly by the 
Census Bureau and the Department of Agriculture, implemented in 1945, adjusted in 
1950, and fundamentally redirected in 1959. The initial system used three parameters: 1) 
value of products sold or used; 2) value of land and buildings; and 3) off-farm work; and 
was meant to . distinguish farms based on similar characteristics. In the 1950 Census, 
value of land and buildings was dropped as a measurement, but a -distinction was again 
made based on offfann employment. The stated purpose of the 1959 Census was to 
segregate farms based on the operating families' reliance on them. This system included 
two major categories: commercial and noncommercial (Welsch and ·Moore 1965). 
In the first essay, Hurley notes that "classification has helped by grouping farms; 
without this grouping, most persons would be using averages in order to describe the · 
United States agriculture," however, "in the era of the specializ.ation for agricultural 
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production, the classification of farms by type may indicate more fundamental 
differences between groups of farms than the classification by economic class" (Hurley 
1965, 1567). Welsch and Moore (1965) state that a major problem with the Census 
classification is that the economic classes of farms are too heterog.eneous to be able to 
' trace any given target group over time. Although both papers agree that some sort of 
classification system is needed for American agriculture, they also indicate that 
traditional measurements have strengths and weaknesses, � further discussed later in the 
data section of this chapter. 
In 1974, the Census excluded the economic classification of farms from its 
reporting. Stanton (1984) states that this was due to the great technological advances in 
agriculture during the period, the volatility of prices, and the unresolved debate regarding 
parameters of classification. However, he too suggests that without a classification 
system, the layman would not comprehend the farm unit structural differences in the 
sector when looking at reported data. 
The next major recognized study on farm classification was conducted by 
Breimyer in 1978. This classification segregated farms into six unique categories: 1) 
smaller .than family size; 2) family size-open market; 3) larger than family size-open 
market; 4) cooperative; 5)  contractually integrated; and 6) large corporations (Breimyer 
1978). In the same year, the Congressional Budget Office introduced in their reporting 
another classification system that included part-time farmers (farms whose operator 
worked off farm more than 200 days per year), small scale farms (sales less than 
$20,000), family farms (those employing less than 1.5 people per year fr�m outside the 
family), larger than family farms (non-industrialized farms that employed more than 1.5 
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hired labor years), and industrialized farms (Congressional Budget Office, 1 978). The 
unique characteristic of this typology was that it used multiple criteria in its 
classification. 1 
The most recently developed and commonly used typology was developed by 
ERS a branch of the USDA that investigates the farm sector and the economic factors 
that drive the industry. This classification system utilizes some aspect of every previous 
one. The typology maintains three goals. The first is to "accurately describe a diverse 
sector that consists of households and businesses ranging from places where families 
enjoy open space and a rural lifestyle to · businesses operated by managers that use state­
of-the art technology and a variety of contracts,' alliances and ventures to organize their 
business"(Johnson 2002, 5). The second is to segregate small farms that are 
homogeneous; and the third is to identify the economic health of farm households as 
autonomous from the farm business (Johnson 2002).2 
Data Considerations 
Debates concerning appropriate data in classification systems are as old as the 
systems themselves. · Even Benedict et al. understood that using aggregate averages was 
useless as a result of farm diversity. They considered several alternatives such as labor 
used, but ultimately used gross value of products produced (Benedict et al. 1944). 
Hurley, Welsch and Moore, and Nikolitch _and McKee all discuss problems with using 
· gross product or sales citing that a gross value of either of these things fails to recognize 
1 In 1985, ERS published a bulletin written by Nora Brooks that investigated smail farms and the difference 
within small fanns between their being rural residence and farm businesses. 
2The Internal Revenue Service has a different way of classifying farms that is worth note. This definition 
was introduced in 197 4 and states that any agricultural enterprise that sells or intends to sell $1000 of 
product in a given year is a farm. This definition is used for tax purposes and is rarely considered in policy 
formulation. 
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efficiency of the farm. Their papers discuss alternative measurements and their 
usefulness. In addition to the common criticism of gross values, Hurley also points out 
that gross values do not account for amount of production consumed on farm, and that 
gross production only ·considers one year that could easily have been affected by 
abnormalities in weather, prices, or yields. Welsch and Moore (1965) cite the latter as a 
limitation· of gross values as well, �hile suggesting that gross sales are not the only 
income farms are capable of realizing (government payments). They also pose the 
question that is the focus of this study: "What is the income from all government 
· programs and how is it distributed among economic classes and types of farms?" (Welsch 
and Moore 1965, 1559) 
Nikolitch and· McKee ( 1965) add to the criticism of gross sales stating that gross 
sales do not account for inventories nor for purchased inputs. They identify alternative · 
measurements that include acreage, labor use, and the value of inputs. 
Hurley (1965) suggests that net farm income could be used, but the difficulty in 
collecting the data due to farmers' and data collectors' comprehension levels of the 
concept of net income, would be too much to overcome, especially when complex owner­
operator agreements exist throughout the sector. He also denounces acreage as a measure 
due to quality and land value divergences. 
The data collection problems are not unique to the United States. In the past 
decade, there has arisen a demand for congruent data among countries. As Boisvert 
notes, "since the effects of domestic farm policy reform in many developed nations will 
likely resonate through the international markets for agricultural products . . .  it is 
imperative that countries agree on the common data needed to effect international 
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comparisons" (Boisvert 2002, 1 -2). He also notes that the United States has the best data 
bank for agriculture in the world. 
Lastly, a study conducted by Tim Wise about the reporting of data in the United 
States is worth noting, as it may shed some light onto the rhetoric that government 
payments are distributed unfairly (Wise 2005). One needs not research very long to find 
. . 
data and statistics that reveal the disparity between farm sizes and according subsides and 
income levels. However, it is important to recognize that-data and statistics can paint any 
picture the manipulator chooses. Wise decries critics of farm subsidies who claim that 
sixty percent of all farmers and ranchers do not collect government subsidy payments; 
- and nationwide, ten percent of the �iggest ( and often most profitable) subsidized crop 
producers collected 72 percent of all subsidies. · Wise argues that, although these 
statements can not be refuted, they are deceptive. The paper reveals six oft-made 
mistakes by researchers and policy makers when analyzing and presenting farm data. 
!'.'our of these - errors are particularly relevant to this study as they depict misconceptions 
related to the well being of the farm sector, especially within the confines of 
contemporaneous typology, which many analyses convey. 
The first oversight that skews the data is when rural residence farms are included 
in farm sector totals. The term rural residence refers to the conglomerate of limited 
resource, retirement, and residential/lifestyle farms as defined by ERS. These farms 
comprise 66.3% of the number of farms in the United States, yet they receive only 1 8% 
of the total government payments. On the other hand, commercial farms (large and very 
large family farms.per ERS typology) account for only 7.2% of the number of farms and 
receive 48% of the .total government payments. This seems irrational prior to exploration 
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that reveals the percentage of total value of production for the two categories are 8 .5% 
and 58.7% respectively. By looking even closer, we see that only 21 % of rural residence 
fanns receive payments, while 78% and 67% of large and very large farms, respectively 
are recipients. When these figures are considered, the distribution of government 
payments appears much more rational. Nevertheless, the latter five figures are often 
omitted by advocacy groups that decry current farm policy. 
The sec�nd shortcoming is partially related to the first. Wise warns against using . 
aggregate averages of farm income when analyzing farm households' financial health. 
Much of the time reports and analyses include rural residence farms which, for the most 
part, do not rely on farm income for survival. When these farms are included in the 
computation of average small farm income, the result is that small farms' household 
incomes are 118% of the national average. However� when rural residence farms (66.3% 
of all farms) are excluded from the equation, the result morphs considerably. In this case, 
small family farms' household income, including government payments and off farm 
income, equates to 91 % �f United States average household income. 
The third problem raised is including off farm income in policy analysis. · 
Although these monies are crucial to both rural economies and most farms' survival, they 
are exogenous to net farm income and should be omitted from analysis when the focus is 
farm worth. The last error pertinent to the study is insignificant consideration of land 
ownership as it relates to government payments, and ultimately farm income. As base 
acreage is the determinant for direct payments, the amount of land o"WDed is an important 
factor in calculating government subsidies. It is estimated that 45% of land in production 
in the United States is rented, and land owners recognize the value of the direct payments 
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and draft contracts with lessees in which they realize the bulk of the payments associated 
with the given parcel Qlyan, Barnard, and Callender 2001 ). In other words, policy 
makers must not assume that all subsidies go to the.person who actually operates the 
farm. Instead, the common situation is that either the landowner explicitly requires a 
portion of the government payments associated with the land, or he/she indirectly realizes 
the subsidies ·through economic rent. 
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Chapter ill: Data and Methods 
Available Sources 
In order to derive a new classification system. for American farms, it will be 
necessary to evaluate currently operating farms and their characteristics. The best data 
available are a series of surveys conducted each year by the ERS and National 
Agriculture Statistics Service, the Agricultural Resource Management Survey. These 
data are used in this study. The survey is completed in three phases. Phase one is 
conducted in the summer of the reference year and is used as a screening tool to verify 
selected operations' operating status. If the farms are involved in production of target 
commodities for the given year, then they may be selected for inclusion in phase two, 
which is conducted in the fall and winter of the reference year. Phase two is similar to 
the previously used Cropping Practices Survey. This phase gathers data involving 
production practices and input use at the individual production unit level. Phase three is 
conducted in the spring following the reference year, and inquires about costs and 
returns, financial structure, and household variables ( e.g. number of family members 
employed by the farm, percentage of household income from the farm, etc.). This phase 
is meant to be representative of all farms in the United States and employs expansion 
factors to provide accurate population estimates. Each observation recorded represents 
di:ffere�t number.s of farms in the population. This · is done because it would be 
impossible to conduct interviews with every farmer in every state every year. The 
number of farms the observation represents is its expansion factor; therefore if the 
-expansion factors were summed, the total would represent the number of farms in the 
associated state. 
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Phase three data are confidential, and attaining them requires completion of a 
project agreement, a memorandum of understanding among the researcher and their 
institution, ERS, and NASS, and an agreement of confidentiality among the 
aforementioned parties. Even after these documents and agreements have been 
completed and satisfied, the data can only ,be accessed in a state NASS office, and none 
of it can be taken off premises. Only approved summaries of the raw data are eligible_ for 
off premise use. 
Gaining access to this data was the largest stumbling block and learning 
experience associated wi":1 the project. However, after multiple telephone conversations, 
email exchanges, and personal meetings, the data were accessed in the Tennessee state 
office, where it had· been made available by the National Agriculture Statistics Service's 
national headquarters. 
Another source of data that could be used is the Census of Agriculture, conducted 
by the National Agricultural Statistics Service. The census is a valuable resource for the 
type of data that will be used in the study. However, it is only administered once every 
five years. More critically for the purposes addressed here, these data are also reported 
only at the county level. 1bis study requires data from individual farm units, and 
therefore ARMS data are more appropriate. Using data aggregated to the county level 
would compromise the ability to reveal how individual farms are affected by government 
subsidies. 
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Geographic Focus 
The use of every state in the study would be the preferred method, but this would 
be too time consuming, as the study is very data intensive. This research is meant to 
provide a framework that future study can use to investigate other and larger sections of 
the country. Therefore, this study focuses on phase three ARMS data for two states: Iowa 
· and Tennessee. There are several reasons the two states are considered. Iowa is a state 
that traditionally produces program crops (i.e. · row crops) while Tennessee is a state 
where production is more diverse. Using these two contrasting states (production and 
practice and geographic location �onsidered) will depict cross sections of aggregate 
production. Another reason that Iowa and Tennessee were chosen is because the study is 
a joint project between the Agricultural Policy Analysis Center at the University of 
Tennessee and the Beginning Farmer Center at Iowa State University. 
Data Employed 
In order to investigate the role of government payments, the study employs 
several traditional means of measurement, with a few variations. Also, three focus years 
were selected: 1996, 2000, and 2003. The year 1996 was chosen because among the 
yearly data available, it was the year in which aggregate government payments was the 
lowest, at $7 .34 billion. The year 2000 represents the highest annual disbursement of 
payments, at $22.90 billion; and 2003 was chosen because it is the most recent data 
available. Total aggregate subsidies totaled $17.21 billion in 2003 (ERS 2005c). This is 
illustrated in figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Aggregate U.S. subsidy outlays for focus years in the study (ERS 2005c) 
In order to reflect farm dependency on government payments, the classification 
system incorporates three variables of measurement; and the subsequent examination of 
subsidy distribution considers several others. The variables chosen for classification are 
intended to depict different aspects of farms' structural characteristics and fmancial 
situations. As prior literature suggests, variables must be chosen to meet the needs of the 
study, and the use of any variable can be argued for or against. The variables used in this 
study were chosen on the basis of their availability and pertinence. 
Two of the classification variables are employed in tandem via a measure 
developed by ARMS that cl3:Ssifies farms based on financial solvency. ARMS divides 
farms into four categories of solvency through consideration of two variables: net farm 
income and debt-to-asset ratio. These classes are shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Agricultural Resource Management Survey solvency classes (Banker, 
Moorehart, and Johnson 1992) 
Solvency Classes 
Net Farm Income 
Debt-to-Asset (+) (-) Ratio <0.4 I II 
>0.4 III IV 
Solvency classes were examined as they depict the financial situation of the fann 
across three variables and two time horizons. Net farm income is a reflection of the 
financial situation in a single year, while the debt to asset ratio is a better measure of an 
- operation's long run financial situation. Both variables that make up the solvency class 
criteria were examined separately and individually as well in order to more thoroughly 
examine them. However, these examinations were carried out after farms were 
segregated. Although the criteria for each solvency class are distinctive, their range is 
broad. For example, it is important in solvency class II to know exactly how deficient 
these farms are in net income. Knowing specific values for net farm income and debts to 
assets enables the study to compare them individually against government payments. 
The third classification variable chosen is the ratio of owned to rented land farmed by the 
operator, termed tenure in this analysis . . 
Upon segregating farms into solvency classes by tenure, the study investigated 
several other variables for differing reasons. Total value of government payments was 
chosen as it is central to the study. The· ultimate goal is to examine farm businesses' 
dependence on them. Total government payments associated with farms in the focus 
years were taken as they reflect the total for all programs for which a farm has qualified 
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and been a participant. Because operators may choose which programs to take advantage 
of in any given year, disaggregating government payments may not capture the whole 
picture for a given farm. By using total government payments, the likelihood of 
including all payments received by each farm is increased. 
Value of crops produced was also examined as it is highly correlated with 
government payments due to the fact that most payments are calculated by incorporating 
crop production on some level, be it current or historical. Value of livestock produced 
was investigated to recognize other enterprises that the farms may be involved in. Acres 
operated is another variable considered by classification. Total debt was also examined 
separately from debt to asset ratio. Farm net worth was also considered. Finally, off 
farm income was chosen. It was chosen as a me3:sure of farm household financial health, 
but from other sources. Total household off farm income was used for years 1996 and 
2000, but off farm income of the primary operator only was used for 2003, as this was the 
only year in the study that off farm income was separated in this manner. 
These variables cover a wide range of characteristics for farm businesses. 
Although they each have inherent strengths and weaknesses, they were chosen as the best 
fit for the study. Individually, they dissect farm operations satisfactorily for the study; 
and in concert, they provide a suitable overall picture of structural characteristics of 
agricultural enterprises, whether or not they play a large role in determining farm 
dependence on subsidies. Descriptive statistics for each variable in each year and state 
are available in Appendix A. 
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Table 3. Number of d d f  . I expan e arms m owa an d T  ennessee 1996 2000, 2003 ' 
Year Number of Observations 
Iowa Tennessee 
1996 86,400 79,948 
2000 99,567 98,534 
2003 87,455 81,062 
It is important to note that immediately after the variables of interest were chosen, 
each observation was replicated in accordance with its expansion factor. This was 
necessary to reflect the true distribution of farms in each year and state, and omission of 
this step would invalidate any succeeding analysis. Table 3 denotes the number of 
expanded observations for each year and state. 
Conceptual Framework 
The premise of the study is to examine the reliance of farms on government 
payments in Iowa and Tennessee. To achieve this, the data must be segregated in a 
manner that ensures that all farms are accounted for only once and no farms are excluded. 
This is most easily accomplished through the isolated consideration of one variable of 
measurement. Upon selection of the primary variable of differentiation, the study 
employs Breimeyer' s idea of modal groups. By choosing only one variable as the initial 
criterion for segregation, the possibility of any single observation being omitted or 
counted more than once is eliminated. 
Afterward, each of the modal groups can be further inspected and segregated by 
other variables into groups that are homogeneous within and heterogeneous across 
groups. When this is completed, investigation of the groups will result in the ability to 
make justifiable statement concerning the reliance of farms in Iowa and Tennessee on 
government payments. 
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Methods 
To begrin the investigation, a series of trial and error was employed to ascertain 
the best variable to use for the primary segregation. The first variable of separation 
chosen was acres operated. The break points for the acreage modal groups entailed those 
farms operating less than 50 acres, farms operating 5 1-99 acres, farms operating 100-149 
acres, farms operating 150-249 acres, farms operating 250-499 acres, farins operating 
500-999 acres, and farms operating 1000 or more acres. This approach was quickly 
dismissed as it masked the fact that some farms re_alize negative net farm incomes, even 
after government payments are accounted for. It is important to the study to highlight 
farms with negative net farm incomes. These farms are important to the study as they 
provide understanding of vulnerability. Farms with negative net income are represented_ 
in solvency classes II and IV, as shown in Appendix B. No business can continue 
operation indefinitely with negative net income, and farms that face this year after year 
must eventually leave the industry. 
The second :approach involved a two step process. The first step was to heed 
Wise's advice and make an attempt to exclude farms that would skew an otherwise 
judicious examination. This involved the inclusion of farms on the condition that they 
produced more than $1000 in crop receipts. After this was done, the remaining farms 
were segregated by solvency class. Separating farms this way ensured that those earning 
negative net farm income would surface. Next, each of the solvency groups was sorted 
by tenure. This was done to highlight the relationship of owned -land to financial health. 
The tenure groups were separated by quartile. 
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After the farms were categorized by solvency and tenure, the mean of each 
variable of interest was calculated for each category, by year. When this was completed, 
the distribution of farms based on this categorization was investigated to illustrate the 
· characteristics of farms based on the new classification system. After a satisfactory 
comprehension of this distribution was attained, the data was modified to reflect the 
absence of government payments. This was done by creating a new variable that 
represented net farm income without government payments for each farm. Another 
variable was then created that assigned a new solvency class based on the resulting net 
fami. income without government payments. The new solvency classification mirrors 
criteria for the old on�. This was done to see how financial health of farms would change 
if government payments were terminated. Appendices A and B compile the data sets 
used. 
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Chapter III: Results 
Analysis of Classification System 
Before reporting the results of the analysis, it is important to note the distribution 
of various characteristics of farms by the classification system. By concentrating only on 
those operations that produce more than $1,000 in crops it becomes clear that Iowa 
retains a much higher percentage of total farms than Tennessee. Table 4 depicts aggregate 
numbers for both states across years, and the number of observations retained when farms 
producing less than $1,000 in crop are excluded. 
Table 4 reinforces the idea that the two states' agricultural sectors are very 
different. Iowa farms are _more concentrated in crop production ( over the three years, an 
average of almost two-thirds of the farms produce more than $1,000 in crops); whereas in 
Tennessee, the distribution is much different (averaging less than- one-quarter of farms 
producing more than $1,000 in crop production). Because the study focuses on 
government payment . reliance associated with crop production, reflecting the current 
distribution criteria, farms that do not produce more than $ 1,000 in crops are omitted · 
because they would skew the data, especially in Tennessee. 
By dividing the data by solvency classes, one observes that most farms fall into 
solvency class one (i.e. have positive net farm income and a debt to asset ratio of less 
than 0.40). Figures 7-9 show the distribution of farms by solvency class for each year 
and state. 
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Table 4. Iowa and Tennessee fann distribution 1996, 2000, 2003 
Year 
1996 
% Retained 
2000 
% Retained 
2003 
% Retained 
All 
Farms 
86,400 
99,567 
87,455 
Iowa 1 996 
Solvency Class 
w, 1 ,327 
Solvency Class 
11, 4,539 
Solvency Class 
N, 9,089 
Iowa 
All Farms Producing 
More Than $1, 000 in 
Crops 
57,805 
67% 
72,243 
73% 
5 1,610 
59% 
Tennessee 
All Farms Producing 
All More than $1,000 in 
Farms Crops 
79,948 22,102 
28% 
98,534 24,703 
25% 
81,062 13,049 
16% 
Tennessee 1 996 
Solvency Class 
W, 2,333 
Solvency Class 
1, 668 
Solvency Class 
I, 5,871 Solvency Class 
� 13,430 
Figure 7. Distribution of fanns by solvency class 1996 
Iowa 2000 
Solvency Class 
P-J, 5,747 
Solvency Class I, 
17,349 
Sc)lvency Class I, 
44,976 
Tennessee 2000 
Solvency Class 
W, 286 
Solvency Class 
I, 7,683 
Solvency Class � 
16,447 
Figure 8. Distribution of farms by solvency class 2000 
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Iowa 2003 
Solvency Class 
IV, 3,003 
Solvency aass H, 
1 1 ,435 
S0111/ency aass I, 
31 ,581 
Tennessee 2003 
Solvency Class 
IV, 54 
Solvency Class 
I, 142 
Solvency Class 
1, 3,496 
Solvency Class � 
9,357 
Figure 9. Distribution of farms by solvency class 2003 
Due to the diversity of farms in both states, it is difficult to make blanket 
statements that hold true over both states and the three focus years. However, there are a 
few things that are consistent throughout. First, in both states in almost every year, for 
those farms that are the most solvent, average farm net worth is the higher than the 
average of any of the other solvency classes. The exception is in Tennessee in 1996, 
where average net farm worth for solvency class II is slightly higher. For solvency 
classes III and IV, net farm worth is considerably lower in every case; and solvency class 
IV is, almost always, the class that is associated with the lowest farm net worth (Figures 
10-11). 
Another trend across years and states is that solvency class III has the lowest 
average ratio of owned to rented land (the exception is Iowa 2003), highest average crop 
production values (the exceptions are Iowa in 1996 and Tennessee in 2000), and highest 
average government payment receipts (the exception is Tennessee 2000). This is 
illustrated in figures 12-1 7. 
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Figure 10. Farm net worth by solvency class in Iowa, 1996, 2000, 2003 
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Figure 11. Farm net worth by solvency class in Tennessee, 1996, 2000, 2003 
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Figure 12. Percentage of operated acres owned by operator in Iowa, 1 996, 2000, 2003 
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Figure 13. Percentage of operated acres owned by operator in Tennessee, 1 996, 2000, 
2003 
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Figure 14. Government payments by solvency class by year in Iowa, 1996, 2000, 2003 
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Figure 15. Crop production by solvency class by year in Iowa, 1996, 2000, 2003 
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Figure 1 6. Government payments by solvency class by year in Tennessee, 1 996, 2000, 
2003 
$700,000 
$600,000 
$500,000 
$400,000 
$300,000 
$200,000 
$1 00,000 
$0 
1 996 2000 2003 
Yea r  
Solwncy Class I 
• Solwncy Class II 
o Sol-..ency Class Ill 
CJ Sol-..ency Class N 
Figure 17. Crop production by solvency class by year in Tennessee, 1 996, 2000, 2003 
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Another way to approach the data for the two states is by segregating them by 
proportion of operated land owned by the operator. Viewed this way it is observed that 
no real trend exists between value of government payments and percentage of land 
owned by the operator. However, in 2000, for those farms whose operators owned less 
than 50% of the land operated, government payments were the difference between 
positive and negative net farm income (Figures 18-23). Also, concerning land ownership 
in the two states, operators in Iowa tend to own a much smaller portion of the land they 
operate (Figure 24). Also, the study found that the value of crops produced is inversely 
proportionate to the percentage of operated land owned by the operator (Figure 25). 
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Figure 18. Government payments' contribution to net fann income in Iowa, 1996 
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Figure 19. Government payments' contribution to net farm income in Tennessee, 1996 
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Figure 20. Government payments' contribution to net farm income in Iowa, 2000 
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Figure 21. Government payments' contribution to net farm income in Tennessee, 2000 
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Figure 22. Government Payments' contribution to net farm income in Iowa, 2003 
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Figure 23. Government Payments' contribution to net farm income in Tennessee, 2003 
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Figure 24. Percentage of operated acres owned by operator in Iowa and Tennessee, 1996, 
2000, 2003 
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Figure 25 . Value of crops produced by operated acres owned in Iowa and Tennessee, 
1996, 2000, 2003 
It appears in Tennessee, in each year, by land ownership ru:rangement, that 
irrespective of government payments, those farms that own between 25% and 50% of the 
land operated have net farm incomes that are significantly higher than all other 
categories. The best explanation found for this trend is that this category in Tennessee 
encompassed a much smaller number of expanded farms, and that at least one of those 
farms, unexpanded realized significantly high net income in each year, which would have 
skewed the resulting average net farm income in the years. 
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Analysis of Vulnerability Concerning Government Payments 
After subtracting government payments from net farm income and reassigning 
observations to solvency classes, not much changed. However, when noticeable changes 
did occur, they were significant. By the nature of the manipulation, the only thing that 
-could result would be shifts between solvency classes one and. two or between solvency 
classes three and four. This is due to the fact that the transformation only affected net 
fann income, which makes up only half the criteria for solvency class determination, the 
other half being debt-to-asset ratio, which was assumed to remain constant. The reason 
this approach was chosen is because typically, net farm income in a given year, unless 
there is an extremely si�able change, will not affect long run decisions of the farmer. 
Net farm income is considered an annual measure of farm financial performance, and 
may exhibit wide variability over a -period of years. However, an enterprise's debt-to­
asset ratio generally indicates financial performance over a multi-year period, and an 
individual farmer has latitude to make within-year decisions that can influence the debt­
to-asset indicator. This is because net income for a farm is only one component of the 
debt-to-asset ratio, and the ratio is a reflection of multiple decisions made over several 
years. It is assumed that no single year's debt-to-asset ratio would significantly affect 
short term decision making. The results are presented by two criteria: land ownership 
arrangement �d solvency class. 
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In 1996, the year in the study in which the least amount of government payments 
was distributed; exclusion of subsidies affected the net farm income the most, by 
percentage, of those farms who owned between 50% and 75% of the land they operated. 
The effect in Iowa was more pronounced. As for solvency class distribution, in Iowa, the 
omission of government payments shifted 9.5% of farms in solvency class I into to 
solvency class II and 8% of farms in solvency class III into solvency class IV. The result 
of omitting subsidies was minimal in Tennessee, even after expansion, moving only three 
farms from solvency class I to solvency class II, and shifting 214 farms from solvency 
class III to solvency class N. These results are depicted in figures 26-29. 
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Figure 26. Net farm income with and without government payments by land ownership 
arrangement in Iowa, 1 996 
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Figure 27. Solvency class distribution with and without government payments by 
solvency class in Iowa, 1 996 
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Figure 28. Net farm income with and without government payments by land ownership 
arrangement in Tennessee, 1996 
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Figure 29. Solvency class distribution with and without government payments in 
Tennessee, 1996 
In 2000 the effect of excluding government payments was very dramatic, 
especially in Iowa. In that year, the only farms that had positive net farm income after 
exclusion of government payments were those whose operators owned more than 75% of 
the acreage that they farmed, and those farms only averaged $2,635 in net farm income. 
Stated another way, net farm income was less than government payments associated with 
land ownership classes, even after government payments were included, except for those 
farms whose operator owned more than 7 5% of the acreage they farmed. 
Considered by solvency class, in Iowa, in 2000 without government payments 
12,764 farms would have been in solvency class II instead of solvency class I, where they 
were with the payments included. This represents 28% of farms in solvency class I. 
There would have been a shift of2,011 farms from solvency class III to solvency class IV 
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in the absence of government payments, representing a 48% loss in nwnber of farms 
included in solvency class III with the presence of subsidies. Also in 2000, in Tennessee 
had government payment not been distributed, only those farms whose operators owned 
more than 75% of the acreage farmed would have realized more than $5,000 in net farm 
income. By solvency class, omission of government payments reduced solvency class I 
by 166 farms and those farms moved into solvency class II. This amounted to a loss of 
1 . 5  percent of farms shifted out of solvency class I. There was no change in the nwnber 
of farms in solvency classes III and IV. These results are illustrated in figures 30-33 .  
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Figure 30. Net farm income by land ownership arrangement with and without 
government payments in Iowa, 2000 
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Figure 32. Net farm income by land ownership arrangement with and without 
government payments in Tennessee, 2000 
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Figure 33. Solvency class distribution with and without government payments in 
Tennessee, 2000 
In 2003, exclusion of government payments reduced net farm income by 33% for 
farms whose operators owned less than 25% of the land they operated, and by the same 
percentage for those farms whose operators owned between 50% and 75% of the land 
they operated. Those operations whose operator owned between 25% and 50% of the 
land they operated would have had net farm income reduced by 28%; and those farms 
whose operators owned more than 75% of the land they operated would have realized a 
27% reduction in net farm income. By solvency class, omission of government payments 
shifted 1,269 farms in Iowa from solvency class I to solvency class II, representing 4% of 
farms in solv�cy class I before government payment were omitted. One hundred thirty 
farms shifted from solvency class III to solvency class IV after the subtraction of 
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government payments, representing 5% of the count in solvency class III before the 
exclusion. In Tennessee, net farm income was reduced by 1 5% for farms whose 
operators owned less than 25% of the land they operated, 12% for fanners who owned 
between 25% and 50% of the land they operated, 34% for farmers who owned between 
50% and 75% of the land they operated, and 8% for farmers who owned more than 75% 
of the land they operated. By solvency class, 95 farms would have moved from solvency 
class I to solvency class II, representing 1 % of the total fanns in solvency class I with 
subsidies included; and 36 farms would have moved from solvency class III to solvency 
class IV, encompassing 25% of farms in solvency class III with payments included. 
These results are shown graphically in figures 34-37. 
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Figure 34. Net farm income by land ownership arrangement with and without 
government payments in Iowa, 2003 
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Figure 35.  Solvency class distribution with and without government payments in Iowa, 
2003 
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Figure 36. Net farm income by land ownership arrangement with and �ithout 
government payments in Tennessee, 2003 
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Chapter IV: Summary and Conclusions 
This study's intent is to examine government payment's role iri net income and 
solvency of farms in Tennessee in Iowa and Tennessee, in the years 1996, 2000, and 
2003. In order to accomplish this, it was necessary to segregate farms in a manner that is 
conducive to that end. The classificati,on system- that was developed provided an avenue 
that facilitated the examination. As mentioned in the literature review, classification 
systems are developed to meet the needs of the study they are associated with, and the 
system developed for this study was the most pertinent to highlight government 
payment's role in net farm income and solvency. 
By using solvency classes, it was possible to highlight farms with negative net 
incomes, and also consider solvency, which is a measure that accounts for decisions 
made over a multi-year time horizon. These measures were chosen because they 
encompass both long term and short term decision making practices of farm operators. 
Net farm income reflects short term decision making, as it changes every year due to, 
among other things, variable costs, and planting decisions. Solvency is an indicatorthat 
includes considerations for long term investments, both as debts and assets. 
Including only those farms that produce more than $1,000 in crops in the study 
was a large determinant, as it omitted a much higher percentage of farms in Tennessee. 
However, since most government subsidies are distributed to those farms that produce 
program crops, inclusion of farms that do not have significant crop production would 
have presented problems when the means of the variables of interest were calculated. 
This would have been most apparent in Tennessee, as retention rates in the state were 
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under thirty percent in every year, whereas in Iowa, omission of those fanns excluded 
only between 41 % and 27% in any given year. 
Also, the study reinforced the initial idea that the firms that make up the 
agricultural sectors in Iowa and Tennessee are structurally different. Consideration of the 
descriptive statistics for the variables of interest in the two states show that, on average, 
Iowa farms operate more acreage and produce more crops. As a result, the average 
amount of government payments received by operators in Iowa is higher than Tennessee 
m every year. Again, this is because most subsidies are tied to production of program 
crops. 
Overall, the study found that the majority of fanns in Iowa and Tennessee have 
debt-to-asset ratios below 0.40. These farms make up solvency classes I and II. Of those 
farms that represent solvency classes I and II, the majority of those fanns have positive 
net farm incomes (solvency class I). By investigating farms by solvency class, it was 
found that for farms in Iowa, government payments play a larger role in financial health 
of the farm than in Tennessee, and that, depending on the year, government payments 
were the difference in many farms' ability to realize positive incomes. This was the most 
prevalent in 2000. In other years, however, government payments made up a significant 
portion of net farm income, and depending on the financial situation of farms in a given 
state and year, the absence of government payments affected considerably the number of 
farms identified as financially solvent. 
Also, absence of government payments shifted a significant number of farms from 
what is labeled as marginally solvent (solvency class III) to financially vulnerable 
(solvency class IV), which are the farms that have debt-to-asset ratios of above 0.40 for 
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both classes. This shift represents a change from ·positive to negative net fann income. 
Although negative ne:t farm income in a year will not drive an operator out of business, 
the combination of negative net fann income and high debt-to-asset ratio is a situation 
that a fanner must consider when m�ng long term decisions. It would be impossible for 
any enterprise to continue operation for an extended period under these circumstances. 
This .is important knowledge as it reveals that government subsides to the fann sector do 
affect the financial health and vulnerability o[ farm enterprises and that the subsidies do 
not represent a mere added profit to the balance sheet of the most profitable farms. 
This research was designed to be the beginning of a larger body of work 
concerning government payments and their distribution. As debates for the 2007 farm 
bill ( and legislation beyond) continue, any information concerning subsidies' contribution 
and distribution is valuable. This study will be helpful in showing just how government 
payments affect farm incomes based on solvency classes and ownership/operation 
arrangements in two states that have very different agricultural industries. Also, the 
development of this classification system may provide a tool with which to better 
understand farm subsidies' role infinancial characteristics on an aggregate level. 
Limitations of the Study 
Although this study uses data that are meant to represent the agricultural sector in 
the United States, it is important to recognize that no two farm enterprises are the same. 
This presents problems when aggregating the data to any extent. What was found in the 
data across all years and states is that the variance of all variables was extremely high. 
This presents problems when performing analysis. However, that is the nature of the 
· data, and the variance represents the diversity of the sector. There is no justifiable way to 
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adjust for the variance in the data without skewing the results, so the data were 
unadjusted. Also, by design, the ARMS data only focuses on selected commodities each 
year. By focusing on a limited set of commodities each year, the likelihood of reporting 
. data that is truly representative of all farms is diminished. This is because farms that 
produce similar commodities are likely to have similar cost and return structures, 
depending on their size. 
Although the data presented limitations to the study, they are prepared with great 
care to be as representative as possible. ERS and NASS collect as much data as 
resources allow in every year, and utilize sophisticated statistical measures to ensure that 
the data are expanded properly to be representative of all farm operations in the United 
States. 
However, the survey used to collect the data only included between 275 and 304 
unexpanded farms in any given year and state. Although efforts are applied to make 
these data representative of all farms in the given state, by expanding approximately 300 
farms to 90,000, each farm represents, on average, 300 farms. As a result, some of the 
observations in a given category of classification represented a significant percentage of 
the whole category; and movement between categories as a result of modifying net farm 
income in some cases may over emphasize the effect. ARMS data were the best 
available for the purposes of the study, but due to expansion issues, the extent to which 
the study presents a true representation of the sector in each state is questionable. 
Lastly, the study did not incorporate rental rates for those farms that did not own 
all the land they operated. Although direct payments are set before the growing season in 
any given year,.they are only one element affecting farm income in a given year. Many 
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of the factors that affect income are revealed throughout and after the growing season, 
such as_ input prices, weather, and market prices. · The year 2000 emphasizes the caution 
farmers should exercise when calculating expected returns a priori, and making decisions 
based on those expectations. 
Although data used in this study preclude any explicit exploration of the effects of 
· land rental rates, other studies have shown that there is a correlation between the rental 
price of a given parcel of land and its associated direct payment (ERS 2005d, Roberts 
2004). Because the direct payment for land is known before the land is leased, the owner 
of the land is able to consider it when determining the price per acre to the lessee, and 
realize economic rent. This practice _drives the rental price of the land up, and therefore 
diminishes the ultimate profit for the operator on the land, irrespective of other subsidy 
programs by which the operator may receive benefits. 
Policy Implications 
As future agricultural policy is discussed for the United States, it is important for 
policy makers understand the role of government payments in the financial and structural 
characteristics of farm enterprises. By showing explicitly the relationship of government 
payments and net farm income and solvency class of farms in Iowa and Tennessee, this 
study will aid in that endeavor. Current federal agricultural subsidies are designed to 
support farmers' incomes. 
One consideration that should be recognized is that ownership of farmland is an 
important factor in assessing commodity policy, and that ownership arrangements affect 
the amount of support that an operator receives. As some subsidies can be calculated 
before the tractor arrives to till the field, if the operator does not own the land he/she 
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operates, there is a good chance that at least a portion of the subsidies he/she will receive 
will be transferred to the land owner. Decoupled payments should be scrutinized as 
many times, absentee landlords receive support based only on the fact that they own the 
land farmed. 
Also, adjusting loan rates only when farm bills are developed (roughly every five 
years) is a long time horizon. As agriculture continues to become · a global industry, there 
are an increasing number of issues that can affect annual prices of commodities. There 
may be merit in considering more frequent loan rate adjustments to reflect changing 
market conditions in a timely manner. 
Recommendations For Future Work 
Since the inception of this study, it has been considered a building block for a 
more broad understanding of the interaction of government payments in the farm sector. 
This small piece of literature explores only one facet of the influence of payments on 
farm enterprises: net farm income. The ultimate goal of the series of studies is to 
understand how government payments affect farm operations on a requisite level that 
includes all aspects · of the operation. Several possibilities exist for future work regarding 
this study. Initially, the study could be expanded to consider every state. As this study 
shows, the face of agriculture varies widely from state to state. To better understand the 
role of government payments on an aggregate level, it would be useful to replicate the 
study for every state. 
Another possibility would be to examine rental arrangements for those enterprises 
that do not m� all the land involved in production. Because government payments can 
influence rental rates, it would be valuable to know exactly how much operators pay to 
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lease the land they operate. This would not be an easy task, if even possible; as there are 
many different types of rental arrangements and there is no requirement to report to 
anyone a particular arrangement between owner and operator. 
Another possibility for future work could include simulations. By design, this 
study did not account for the fact that government payments affect decision making for 
operators of farms. If it were possible to simulate decision making concerning enterprise 
mix and other structural characteristics associated with the absence of government 
payments then it would shed better light on a broader range of the effects of government 
payment abolishment. Due to the time constraints of this study, however, this was not 
possible in this research. 
Lastly, related to the aforementioned recommendation, it would be valuable to 
reassess debt-to-asset ratios in the absence of government payments. However, since this 
ratio is affected by government payments (through decision making), it is difficult to 
judge augmented debt-to-asset ratios within the confines of this study. Because the study 
looked only at the change in net farm income, debt-to-asset ratios were held constant. By 
running a simulation, changes in decision making concerning debt loads and asset 
investment could be considered. 
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Appendix A 
Table 5. DescriEtive statistics for variables of interest in Iowa, 1996 
Iowa 1996 
Mean Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation Mode 
Value of Crop Production $98, 1 82 $12,961 ,446 $0 408,705 $0 
Value of Livestock Production $44,268 $2,250,000 $0 1 32;1 1 3  $0 
Government Payments $5,71 7 $1 1 2,000 $0 6,987 $0 
Net Farm Income $27,807 $706,637 ($1 90,704) . 69,960 $1 3,532 
Total Debt $77,345 $1 , 1 22,61 0 $0 1 1 8,590 $1 55,676 
Tenure 0.61 1 .00 0.00 0.40 1 .00 
Households Involved 1 .09 5 .00 1 .00 0.31 1 .00 
Farm Net Worth $383,587 $5,343,231 ($205,850) 378,751 $541 ,727 
Off Farm Income $42,716 $1 ,000,250 $0 64,054 $5,250 
Acres 370 4,900 1 365 1 60 
Debt to Asset 0.1 6  2.53 0 .00 0. 1 9  0.22 
* Tenure refers to the percentage of operated acres owned by the operator 
Table 6. DescriEtive statistics for variables of interest in Iowa, 2000 
Jowa 2000 
Mean Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation Mode 
Value of Crop Production $52,703 $1 1 ,262,053 $0 242,908 $0 
Value of Livestock Production $50,808 $1 0,253,01 7  $0 244,806 $0 
Government Payments $17,054 $261 ,709 $0 24,369 $0 
Net Farm Income $15,946 $1 ,904,921 ($1 ,857,469) 78,480 $33,71 7  
Total Debt $88,928 $2,705,632 $0 1 63,684 $125 
Tenure 0.65 1 .00 0.00 0.40 1 .00 
Households Involved 1 . 1 1  4.00 1 .00 0.37 1 .00 
Farm Net Worth $432,296 $3,91 8,226 ($1 78,735) 426,548 $643,504 
Off Farm Income $68,220 $1 ,058,500 ($7,500) 1 58,690 $0 
Acres 312 4,979 2 369 . 40 
Debt to Asset 0. 1 6  1 .97 0.00 0 . 19  0.00 
* Tenure refers to the percentage of operated acres owned by the operator 
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Table 7. DescriEtive statistics for variables of interest Iowa, 2003 
Jowa 2003 
Mean Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation Mode 
Value of Crop Production $64,775 $2,433,050 $0 1 40,557 $0 
Value of Livestock Production $52,434 $8, 1 92,576 $0 227,401 $0 
Government Payments $9,395 $1 53,295 $0 14, 1 32 $0 
Net Farm Income $28,101 $2,472,3 1 5  -$3,652, 776 1 22,461 $4,365 
Total Debt $94,476 $4,299,851 $0 204,079 $100 
Tenure 0.68 1 .00 0.00 0.38 1 .00 
Households Involved 1 .29 1 7.00 1 .00 0.88 1 .00 
Farm Net Worth $495,740 $6,460,628 ($2, 1 31 , 1 90) $576,024 $21 6,625 
Operator Off Farm Income $1 7,488 $750,000 $0 $31 ,795_ $0 
Acres 374 8, 1 70 1 534 40 
Debt to Asset 0.1 7  6.03 0.00 0.33 0.00 
* Tenure refers to the percentage of operated acres owned by the operator 
Table 8. DescriEtive statistics for variables of interest in Tennessee 1996 
Tennessee 1996 
Mean Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation Mode 
Value of Crop Production $1 1 ,472 $4,275 , 1 97 $0 85,859 $0 
Value of Livestock Production $1 4,464 $4,334,723 $0 82,592 $0 
Government Payments $404 $96,278 $0 3,282 $0 
Net Farm Income $3,473 $1 ,51 8,859 ($1 , 1 44,009) 44,674 $5,644 
Total Debt $29,776 $741 ,343 $0 71 ,061  $201 
Tenure 0.73 1 .00 0 .00 0.33 1 .00 
Households Involved 1 .05 4.00 1 .00 0.23 1 .00 
Farm Net Worth $273,039 $4,445,280 ($85,389) 3 1 0,079 $1 48,844 
Off Farm Income $57,836 $1 ,077,500 $0 91 ,903 $37,500 
Acres $ 1 63 $4,233 $3 300 $43 
Debt to Asset 0.09 2.03 0.00 0. 1 8  0.00 
* Tenure refers to th� percentage of operated acres owned by the operator 
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Table 9. DescriEtive statistics for variables of interest in Tennessee, 2000 
Tennessee 2000 
Mean Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation Mode 
Value of Crop Production $10,059 $1 ,429,871 $0 52,51 1 $0 
Value of Livestock Production $1 1 ,095 $1 ,301 ,000 $0 48,486 $0 
Government Payments $1 ,850 $51 8,391 $0 1 0,977 $0 
Net Farm Income $4, 1 79 $386,230 ($483,565) 24,064 $6,369 
Total Debt $1 7,537 $1 ,81 6,478 $0 49,212 $200 
Tenure 0.79 1 0 0.33 
Households Involved 1 . 1 6  4 1 0.44 1 
Farm Net Worth $328,8 1 5  $8,800,091 ($205,573) 455,505 $79,658 
Off Farm Income $62,084 $282,250 $0 61 ,668 $1 50,000 
Acres 146 6,200 4 232 1 1 0 
Debt to Asset 0.05 2.21 0 0. 14 0.21 
· * Tenure refers to the percentage of operated acres owned by the operator 
Table 10. DescriEtive Statistics for variables of interest in Tennessee, 2003 
Tennessee 2003 
Mean · Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation Mode 
Value of Crop Production $12,767 $5,783,680 $0 98,478.00 $0 
Value of Livestock Production $1 1 ,764 $1 ,027,847 $0 43,991 .00 $0 
Government Payments $1 , 1 90 $41 2, 1 32 $0 7,768.00 $0 
Net Farm Income $7,055 $2,633,71 3 -$499,735 47,654.00 $4,250 
Total Debt $21 ,521 $2,314,750 $0 80,344.00 $250 
Tenure 0.84 1 .00 0.00 0.30 1 .00 
Households Involved 1 . 1 4  6.00 1 .00 0.45 1 .00 
Farm Net Worth $424,692 $1 0,068,297 ($469,494) 61 9,350 $1 23,426 
Operator Off Farm Income $25,856 $750,000 $0 37,855 $0 
Acres 1 37 14,680 4 323 30 
Debt to Asset 0.05 2.79 0.00 0.1 3  0.00 
* Tenure refers to the percentage of operated acres owned by the operator 
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Appendix B 
Table 11. Means of Variables of Interest for Iowa, 1996, 2000, 2003 
All Farms 
Producing More 
Than SJO00 in 
Nttlcn]�c,ne 
Value of Without 
Value of Crop livestock Government Net Farm Government Households Farm Net Off Farm Debt to 
Iowa 1996 N Production Production P�ments Income P�ents Total Debt Tenure Involved Worth Income Acres Asset 
Total 57,805 $146,753 $50,797 $6,571 $35,060 $28,489 $100,147 0.46 1.20 $453,789 $41,875 499 0.18 
0\ 
Tenure <0.25 22,667 $204,643 $56,763 $5,436 $44,770 $39,334 $75,817 0.08 1 .25 $251,569 $62,397 532 0.19 
\0 Tenure 0.25 -0.49 10,504 $193,220 $75,093 $7,497 $39,386 $31,889 $173,425 0.38 1 .02 $671,750 $46,128 628 0.24 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 7,466 $98,587 $58,033 $13,538 $39,877 $26,339 $126,521 0.62 1.00 $502,462 $10,308 667 0.14 
Tenure >=O. 75 17,938 $62,475 $26,616 $4,455 $17,655 $13,200 $79, 125 0.92 1.05 $557,952 $23,368 314 0. 15 
lowa 2000 
Total 72,243 $72,628 $55,654 $22,281 $16,389 ($5,892) $109,898 0.55 1 .09 $490,896 $73,997 398 0. 1 8  
Tenure <0.25 22,058 $13l,l01 $63,230 $33,214 $15,263 ($17,952) S l l0,880 0.05 l . 19  $302,757 $40,905 563 0.26 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 9,807 $141,198 $64,657 $29,056 $16,965 ($12,091) $159,538 0.35 1 . 10  $595,279 $264,336 526 0.18 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 10,054 $61,888 $70,292 $22,257 $21,973 ($284) $ 159,481 0.61 1.06 $689,896 $45,586 449 0.19 
Tenure >=O. 75 30,637 $27, 168 $41,945 $12,351 $14,986 $2,635 $77,124 0.% 1 .02 $528, 1 12 $44,218 223 0. 12 
Iowa 2003 
Total 5 1 ,610 $109,738 $65,776 $13,018 $43,71 5  $30,697 $125,943 0.56 1 .30 $656,970 $13,397 539 0. 18  
Tenure <0.25 14,930 $188,031 $80,590 $17,716 $54,420 $36,705 $147,857 0.06 1.45 $429,058 $1 1,814 784 0.34 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 7,984 $134,254 $ l l2,873 $16,622 $60,244 $43,622 $245,280 0.36 l . 18 $793,618 $12,654 697 0.20 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 7,948 $102,152 $72,335 $15, 179 $46,642 $3 1 ,463 $154,705 0.61 1 .27 $843,202 $10,884 594 0.14 
Tenure >=O. 75 21 ,321 $47,817 $35,3 14 $7,602 $28,230 $20,628 $58,284 0.97 1.25 $694,556 $1 5,443 289 0.08 
* Tenure refers to the percentage of operated acres owned by the operator 
Table 12. Means of Variables of Interest for Tennessee, 1996, 2000, 2003 
All Farms 
Producing More 
Than $1000in 
Crops 
Net farm income 
Value of Without 
Value of Crop Livestock Government Net Farm Government Households Farm Net Off Farm Debt to 
Tennessee 1996 N Production Production P�ments Income P�ments Total Debt Tenure Involved Worth Income Acres Asset 
Total 22,102 $41,385 $19,413 $1 ,108 · $8,891 $7,783 $42,764 0.69 1 . 15 $41 1,630 $45,053 250 0.15 
Tenure <0.25 4,679 SI 13,874 $16,654 $2,529 $1 1 ,432 $8,903 $43,255 0.08 1.06 $442,575 $35,386 449 0. 15 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 2,323 $48,451 $38,025 $1,494 $25,144 $23,650 $26,650 0.33 1 .48 $588,635 $37,642 306 0.05 0 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 2,540 $45,228 $52,063 $3,134 $6,807 $3,673 $91,220 0.63 1 . 14 $214,638 $17,519 328 0.45 
Tenure >=O. 75 12,778 $12,722 $10,713 $1 13  $5,537 $5,424 $35,549 0.98 1.47 $409,320 $56,401 155 0. 10 
Tennessee 2000 
Total 24,703 $39,754 · $12,684 $6,080 $13,241 $7,161 $26,743 0.72 1 .08 $428,121 $41,124 261 O.Q7 
Tenure <0.25 5,600 $65,757 $9,398 $1 1,412 $10,841 ($572) $26, 120 0.09 1 .01 $271,227 $39,515 419 0.1 1  
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 755 $137,906 $75,096 $38,263 $33,195 ($5,068) $232,835 0.36 1.49 $634,573 $39,818 904 0.59 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 2,414 $25,986 $20,919 $3,235 $7,413 $4,178 $17,912 0.66 1 .32 $409,478 $24,369 316 0.02 
Tenure >=0.75 15,955 $28,024 $9,941 $3,126 $14,106 $10,980 $18,723 0.97 1.05 $476,464 $44,333 166 0.04 
Tennessee 2003 
Total 13,049 $79,202 $14,007 $4,549 $32,520 $27,971 $3 1 ,897 0.75 1 . 1 1  $537,362 $6,958 284 0.03 
Tenure <0.25 2,895 $158,195 $21,7 1 1  $10,869 $71,879 $61,010 $58,292 0.14 1.08 $296,396 $789 470 0.07 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 619 $358,872 $16,491 $19,635 $167,214 $147,579 $165,679 0.37 1 . 1 3 $1 , 139,991 $6,881 1,244 0.08 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 1,097 $162,543 $23,168 $10,487 $30,493 $20,006 $94,258 0.62 1 .54 $764,696 $4,221 574 0.07 
Tenure >=O. 75 8,637 $23,714 $9,963 $794 $10,481 $9,687 $6,750 0.99 1.06 $549,595 $9,668 127 0.01 
* Tenure refers to the percentage of operated acres owned by the operator 
Appendix C 
Table 13. Means of Variables of Interest for Iowa in 1996 With and Without Government Payments for Solvency Classes I and 
II 
All Farms Producing Value of 
more than $1000 in Value of Crop Livestock Government Net Farm Households Farm Net Off Farm Debt to 
Crol! N Production Production P'!I!!!.ents Income Total Debt Tenure Involved Worth Income Acres Asset 
Solvency Gass I 
Total 42,850 $1 37,1 38 $50,052 $7,000 $49,472 $86,072 0.46 1 . 13 $490,620 $45,602 523 0. 13  
Tenure <0.25 16,627 $163,812 $53,874 $5,435 $60,507 $56,61 3  0.07 1 .33 $275,014 $77,707 542 0. 13 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 7,759 $210,527 $81,412 $7,671 $53,223 $159,219 0.40 1 .02 $700,258 $5 1 , 134 65 1 0. 19 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 5,572 $1 14,032 $65,487 $16,929 $57,1 12 $126,410 0.62 1 .00 $505,338 $8,629 767 0. 1 1  
Tenure>=0.75 13,193 $68,3 1 9  $20,659 $4,294 $30,281 $62,287 0.91 1 .02 $589,483 $19,331 325 0. 1 1  
Solvency Gass I Without Government Payments 
Total 38,770 $139,704 $54,450 $7,338 $47,192 $84,615 0.42 l . 1 5  $472,770 $48,823 540 0. 13 
Tenure <0.25 16,238 $161,330 $53,558 $5,340 $56,495 $56,221 0,07 1 .34 $275,551 $74,357 535 0. 13  
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 7,759 $210,527 $81,412 $7,671 $45,552 $159,219 0.40 1.02 $700,258 $5 1 , 134 65 1 0.19 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 5,464 $1 10, 1 12 $66,650 $16,942 $41,054 $122,418 0.62 1.00 $447,921 $8,285 3 13  0. 1 1  
Tenure >=0.75 9,610 $60,255 $27,647 $4,849 $36,471 $49,734 0.93 1 .04 $617,449 $23,678 339 0. 10 
Solvency Gass II 
Total 9,089 $187,985 $46,840 $3,419 ($31 ,007) $70,529 0.50 1 .06 $354,196 $24,868 346 0. 1 6  
Tenure <0.25 3,570 $394,328 $57,650 $3,040 ($25,760) $71,869 0. 13 I .OJ $216,123 $20,890 390 0. 16 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 1,296 $88,081 $72,730 $5,436 ($43,918) $142,294 0.34 1 .00 $596,820 $16,366 499 0.24 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 1,240 $59,079 $22,667 $2,624 ($16,175) $45,790 0.61 1 .00 $700,3 18 $12, 1 59 365 0.08 
Tenure >=0.75 3,254 $38,968 $30,978 $3,267 ($37,25 1 )  $44, 1 56 0.96 1 .21 $449,5 1 1  $48,3 1 5  246 0. 14 
Solvency Gass II Without Govern�ent Payments 
Total 13,169 $164,677 $34,885 $3,534 ($24,501) $79,634 0.59 I .OJ $463, 187 $24,966 350 0. 1 5  
Tenure <0.25 3,959 $381,859 $58,574 $3,664 ($26,397) $7 1,979 0. 12 I .OJ $216,71 5  $34,215 433 0. 1 5  
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 1,296 $88,081 $72,730 $5,436 ($49,354) $142,294 0.34 1 .00 $596,820 $16,366 499 0.24 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 1,348 $79,370 $21,387 $3,71 8  ($17,606) $68,430 0.61 1 .00 $1 , 129,267 $14,190 417 0.09 
Tenure>=0.75 6,837 $65,684 $15,748 $3,024 ($20,401) $71 ,302 0.91 1 .04 $534,017 $21,388 268 0. 1 5  
* Tenure refers to the percentage of operated acres owned by the operator 
Table 1 3  continued 
All Farms Producing Value of 
more than $1000 in Value of Crop Livestock Government Net Farm Households Farm Net Off Farm Debt to 
Crof!:!. N Production Production P'!f!!!.ents Income Total Debt Tenure Involved Worth Income Acres Asset 
Solvency Class III 
Total 4,539 $163,161 $69,058 $8,883 $47,843 $233,129 0.38 1 .08 $209,167 $30,059 582 0.55 
Tenure <0.25 2,144 $21 1 ,825 $78,261 $9,484 $50,774 $200,127 0.07 1 .02 $149,587 $3 1,643 686 0.60 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 1,101 $186,190 $46,278 $7,200 $63,751 $256,5 1 5  0.30 1 .00 $349,903 $33,167 623 0.54 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 265 $34,832 $65,068 $6,085 $17,365 $180,038 0.60 1 .00 $141 ,873 $250 393 0.47 
Tenure>=0.75 1,092 $69,707 $76,579 $9,839 $38,202 $304,226 0.98 1 . 50 $303,934 $30,000 385 0.50 
Solvency Class III Without Government Payments 
Total 4,203 $164,351 $71,237 $8,235 $42,324 $242,036 0.39 1 .09 $214,123 $27,639 584 0.55 
Tenure <0.25 1,876 $216,328 $82,431 $8,279 $47,432 $210,662 0.08 1 .03 $148,032 $27,737 698 0.60 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 1,101 $186,190 $46,278 $7,200 $56,551 $256,5 1 5  0.30 1 .00 $349,903 $33, 167 623 0.54 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 197 $39,266 $83,001 $3,577 $ 1 8, 195 $206,543 0.56 1 .00 $141,873 $250 383 0.48 
Tenure >=0.75 1,092 $69,707 $76,579 $9,839 $28,362 $304,226 0.98 1 . 50 $303,935 $30,000 385 0.49 
Solvency Class IV 
Total 1,327 $1 18,623 $39,518 $6,376 ($21,507) $302,644 0.50 1 .07 $228,464 $38,152 469 0.73 
Tenure <0.25 326 $162,675 $53,042 $5,086 ($24,962) $280,976 0.08 1 .34 $33,069 $33,220 595 0. 1 3  
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 348 $221 , 153 $34,163 $12,229 ($35,965) $343,209 0.39 1 .00 $529,201 $17,000 608 0.41 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 389 $46,735 $59,205 $4,834 ($12,979) $348,999 0.70 1 .00 $193,978 $48,839 383 0.60 
Tenure >=0.75 399 $41 , 139 $51 ,273 $4,7 17  ($8,307) $305,000 0.84 1 .00 $127,451 $53,182 3 1 5  0.64 
Solvency Class IV Without Government Payments 
Total 1,663 $124,613 $39,978 $8,521 ($22,881)  $266,086 0.44 1 .06 $217,987 $40,634 488 0.69 
Tenure <0.25 594 $170,631 $5 1,250 $10,875 ($17,259) $21 1,228 0.05 1 . 19 $88,787 $42,730 597 0.98 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 348 $221 , 153 $34,163 $1 2,229 ($48,194) $343,209 0.39 1 .00 $529,201 $ 17,000 608 0.41 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 457 $43,053 $52,347 $6,101 ($16,465) $3 1 2,433 0.71 1 .00 $193,978 $48,839 388 0.57 
Tenure >=0.75 399 $41 , 1 39 $51,273 $4,7 17  ($13,024) $305,000 0.84 1 .00 $127,451 $53, 1 82 3 1 5  0.64 
* Tenure refers to the percentage of operated acres owned by the operator 
Table 14. Means of Variables of Interest in Tennessee for 1996 With and Without Government Payments for Solvency Classes 
I and II 
All Farms Producing Value of 
More Than $1000 in Value of Crop Livestock Govemment Net Farm Households Farm Net OJJFarm Debt to 
Croe!, N Production Production P�ents Income Total Debt Temn Involved Worth Income Acres Asset 
Solveaey 0111 I 
Total 1 3,430 $37,085 $20,252 $927 $21 ,946 $27,403 0.73 I . I I  $472,840 $46,207 224 0.07 
Tenure <0.2S 2,139 $ 1 18, 134 $26,875 $2,488 $44,806 $44,419 0.06 1 .06 $222,1 57 $42,691 J9S 0. 12  
Tenure 0.2S -0.49 1,928 $SO,JS6 $44,516 $1 ,688 $3 1,800 $25,021 0.34 I .S2 $596,401 $34,858 J I  I 0.04 
Tenure O.S0-0.74 515 $125,222 $77,865 $6,222 $82,473 $58,609 0.59 1 .23 $6SO,J l7 $19,446 701 0.04 
Tenure>=0.75 8,936 $10,043 $10,619 $101 $1 1 , 1 1 6  $22,326 0.97 1 .02 $490,621 $51,564 140 0.07 
--..J Solvency Oass I Without Government Payments 
Total 13,427 $36,967 $20,256 $906 $21,034 $27,338 0.73 I . I I $472,198 $46,220 224 0.07 
Tenure <0.25 2,139 $1 1 8, 134 $26,875 $2,488 $42,3 19  $44,419 0.06 1 .06 $222, 1 57 $42,691 J9S 0. 12  
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 1,928 $50,356 $44,516 $1,688 $30, 1 1 2  $25,021 0.34 I .S2 $596,401 $34,858 J I  I 0.04 
Tenure O.S0-0.74 512 $122,636 $78,310 $5,695 $76,976 ss1,im 0.59 1 .23 $635,598 $19,586 69S 0.04 
Tenure>=0.7S 8,936 $10,043 $10,619 $101 $1 1,0 16 $22,326 0.97 1 .02 $490,621 $Sl ,S64 140 0.07 
Solvency Oass II 
Total 5,671 $43,561 $22,474 $708 ($10,262) $16,803 0.58 1 .05 $477,795 $43,873 334 0.05 
Tenure <0.25 2,212 $72,871 $9,091 $441 ($4,261) $17,769 0. 10 I .OJ $647,615  $30,468 428 0.06 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 387 $37,760 $4,098 $527 ($9,544) $28,413 0.30 1 .00 $532,377 $66,556 276 0. 1 1  
Tenure O.S0-0.74 501 $33,143 $140,628 $4,583 ($38,336) $34, 1 5 1  0.59 1 .48 $502,603 $34,JS I  S I S  - 0.03 
Tenure>=0.7S 2,701 $21,104 $13,069 $201 ($9,870) $10,383 0.99 1 .05 $323,309 $56,684 23 1 0.02 
Solvency Ow II Without Government Payments 
Total S,674 $43,837 $22,463 $759 ($10,990) $16,964 0.58 1 .05 $479,262 $43,844 JJS 0.05 
Tenure <0.2S 2,212 $72,871 $9,091 $441 ($4,701 )  $17,769 0. 10 I .OJ $647,61 5  $30,468 428 0.06 
Tenure 0.2S -0.49 387 $37,760 $4,098 $527 ($10,072) $28,41 3  0.30 1 .00 $532,377 $66,556 276 0. 1 1  
Tenure O.S0-0.74 504 $36,3 18  $139,803 $5,129 ($42,946) $35,853 0.59 1 .46 $560,200 $33,447 522 0.03 
Tenure>=0.75 2,701 $21 , 104 $13,069 $201 ($10,07 1) $10,383 0.99 I .OS $323,309 $56,684 23 1 0.02 
* Tenure refers to the percentage of operated acres owned by the operator 
Table 14  continued 
All Fanns Producing Value of 
More Than $1000 in Value of Crop livestock Government Net Fann Households Fann Net Off Fann Debt to 
Crol?!. N Production Production Paf!!!_ents Income Tota/ Debt Tenure Involved Worth Income Acres Asset 
Solvency Class ID 
Total 668 $159,681 $13,126 $6,600 $36,743 $305,693 0.40 1.08 $135,765 $23, 155 593 0.72 
Tenure <0.25 283 $230,368 $530 $6,849 $65,564 $144,025 0.o7 1 .05 $79,232 $35,819 577 0.92 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 
Tenure >=O. 75 
Solvency Class ID Without Government Payments 
Total 454 $169,273 $16,718 $4,294 $44,530 $255,419 0.33 1 . 1 3  $77,788 $36,690 536 0.76 
Tenure <0.25 283 $230,368 $530 $6,849 $58,71 5  $144,025 0.07 1 .05 $79,232 $35,819 577 0.92 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 
Tenure 0.50-0. 74 0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 0.00 0.00 $0 $0 0 0.00 
Tenure >=0.75 
Solvency Class IV 
Total 2,333 $26,974 $8,941 $1,543 ($27,682) $1 19,004 0.80 1 . 5 1  $65,473 $46,974 IOI 0.65 
Tenure <0.25 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 0.00 0.00 $0 $0 0 0.00 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 1,310 $3,028 $15,655 $0 ($6,378) $73,407 0.67 1 . 10  $50,893 $1 7,563 47 0.74 
Tenure >=0.75 978 $5,340 $177 $0 ($4,854) $1 57,625 1 .00 2.00 $41,506 $90,000 27 0.53 
Solvency Class IV Without Government Payments 
Total 2,547 36,415 8,653 2,379 (26,802) 143,651 0.78 1 .46 78,182 43,376 153 0.65 
Tenure <0.25 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 1,524 22, 168 14,230 1,614 (5,536) 121,001 0.65 1 .09 73,881 1 5,764 141 0.73 
Tenure >=O. 75 978 5,340 177 0 (4,854) 1 57,625 1 .00 2.00 41,506 90,000 27 0.53 
* Unable to report due to risk of disclosure. 
** Tenure refers to the percentage of operated acres owned by the operator 
Table 15. Means of Variables of Interest for Iowa in 2000 With and Without Government Payments for Solvency Classes I and 
II 
All Farms Producing Value of 
more than $ I 000 in Value of Crop Livestock Government Net Farm Households Farm Net Off Farm Debt to 
Croe, N Production Production P�tnts Income Total Dtbt Tenure lrwolved Worth Income Acres Asset 
Solvency aass I 
Total 44,976 $59, 167 $48, 136 $20,278 $37,3 12  $76,237 0.62 1 . 10 $550,720 $92,372 354 0. 1 1  
Tenure <0.25 10,633 $104,709 $73,988 $29,370 $46,8 16 $76,367 0.04 1 .24 $317,449 $47,583 532 0. 16 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 6,555 $85,236 $83,758 $25, 1 93 $50,709 $1 10,696 0.33 1 . 1 5  $585,325 $379,682 485 0. 15  
Tenure 0.50-0.74 6,221 $60,042 $82,246 $24,296 $35,280 $135,973 0.65 1 . 10 $845,849 $39,807 488 0. 16 
Tenure >=0.75 21,838 $28,700 $14,542 $1 3,208 $28,825 $47,899 0.97 1 .01 $57 1 ,846 $39,486 1 89 0.06 
Solvency Oass I Without Government Payments 
Total 32,212 $49,81 6  $49,020 $1 7,079 $28,800 $62,772 0.70 1 .09 $540,794 $44,799 305 0. 10 
Tenure <0.25 6,974 $91,391 $90,546 $22,973 $35,027 $81,505 0.03 1 .27 $286,389 $57,521 490 0. 19 
-...J Tenure 0.25 -0.49 2,594 $94,809 $1 50,866 $32,221 $78,500 $130,470 0.37 1 .29 $724,514 $30,501 566 0. 1 1  
Ul Tenure 0.50-0.74 2,575 $80,482 $126,592 $28,255 $41,308 $ 1 10,620 0.59 1 .03 $ 1,016,955 $49,550 568 0. 1 5  
Tenure>=0.75 20,069 $25,61 8  $ 1 1 ,473 $1 1 ,640 $18,608 $41,373 0.98 1 .01 $544,605 $41,395 1 72 0.06 
Solvency Oass II 
Total 17,349 $100,591 $5 1,513 $21 ,412 ($29,889) $77,731 0.50 1 .09 $483, 1 86 $43,201 424 0. 13 
Tenure <0.25 6,594 $198,785 $35,340 $34,702 ($30,983) $102,886 0.07 1 .24 $393,564 $36,223 590 0. 1 8  
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 2,193 $296,401 $26,242 $32,876 ($25,741) $1 14,686 0.39 1 .00 $681,253 $23,129 53 1 0. 10 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 2,648 $50, 1 53 $37,683 $10,060 ($41,866) $48,684 0.56 1 .00 $436, 133 $33, 161 350 0.09 
Tenure >=0.75 5,956 $20,91 3  $84,510 $8,234 ($24,980) $54,786 0.99 1 .01 $529,722 $62,353 241 0. 10 
Solvency Oass II Without Government Payments 
Total 30, 1 1 3  $93,036 $49,136 $24,352 ($34,92 1) $91,500 0.46 1 . 10 $522,863 $1 14,420 447 0. 14 
Tenure <0.25 10,253 $174,271 $37,870 $37, 1 5 1  ($47,977) $89,927 0.06 1 .22 $387,134 $33,342 597 0. 16 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 6, 1 54 $156,450 $34,975 $24,969 ($26,799) $103,782 0.34 1 .04 $560,840 $399,808 468 0. 1 5  
Tenure 0.50-0.74 6,294 $47,5 19  $45,355 $16,687 ($27,890) $109,621 0.63 1 .08 $603,472 $33,025 397 0. 14 
Tenure >=0.75 7,725 $30,702 $76,460 $13,445 ($29,802) $70, 163 0.97 1 .01 $605,818  $52,444 272 0.09 
* Tenure refers to the percentage of operated acres owned by the operator 
Table 1 5  continued 
All Farms Producing Value of 
more than $ 1000 in Value of Crop livestock Government Net Farm Households Farm Net Off Farm Debt to 
Crol?!. N Production Production Payments Income Total Debt Tenure Involved Worth Income Acres Asset 
Solvency Oass III 
Total 4, 171 $106,578 $98,972 $38,763 $67,389 $369,477 0.27 1 . 1 S  $259,564 $48,96S S39 O.S9 
Tenure <0.2S 2,560 $ll0,94S $74,101 $36,954 $45,086 $198,837 0.04 I.OS $138,721 $31 ,009 548 0.62 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 0.00 0.00 $0 $0 0 0.00 
Tenure 0.50-0. 74 1 , 185 $97,798 $80,399 $38,804 $94,771 $530,477 0.54 1 .00 $438,235 $103,690 463 0.52 
Tenure >=0.75 426 $104,757 $300,092 $49,516 $125,248 $947,066 0.90 2.22 $488,747 $4,642 692 0.S8 
Solvency Oass III Without Government Payments 
Total 2,160 $131 ,93 1 $125,773 $44,791 $73,701 $467,791 0.43 1 .26 $354,642 $59,771 657 O.S3 
Tenure <0.25 737 $204,615  $65,88S $56,949 $74,825 $307,636 0. 12 I.OS $283,070 $5,775 9S6 O.S2 
Tenure 0.2S -0.49 0 $0 so $0 so so 0.00 0.00 so so 0 0.00 
Tenure 0.50-0. 74 1,185 $97,798 $80,399 $38,804 $55,966 $530,477 0.54 1 .00 $438,235 $103,690 463 0.52 
Tenure >=0.75 238 $76,804 $537,140 $36,945 $158,5 18 $651,620 0.83 3 . 18 $160,063 $8,309 694 0.57 0\ 
Solvency Class IV 
Total S,747 $68,918  $95,SSO $28,620 ($44,674) $282,040 0.43 1 .00 $226,559 $41,997 564 O.S6 
Tenure <0.25 2,271 $80,862 $81,581 $42,679 ($3 1,812) $196,536 0.06 1 .00 $180,24S $33,096 646 0.54 
Tenure 0.2S -0.49 1,059 $166,197 $25,978 $45,057 ($103,466) $554,741 0.41 1 .00 $478,848 $49,861 763 O.S2 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 0.00 0.00 $0 $0 0 0.00 
Tenure >=0.7S 2,417 $15,072 $139, 1 58 $8,207 ($30,999) $242,897 0.80 1 .00 $1S9,S3S $46,91 S  399 0.60 
Solvency Class IV Without Government Payments 
Total 7,758 $71,621 $88,97S $29,571 ($59,424) $277,332 0.3S 1 .01 $208,642 $40,794 S24 O.S9 
Tenure <0.2S 4,094 $77,395 $79,730 $36,530 ($49,706) $177,974 0.04 1 .02 $135,769 $36,709 S29 O.S9 
Tenure 0.2S -0.49 1,059 $166,197 $25,978 $45,057 ($148,523) $554,741 0.41 1 .00 $478,848 $49,861 763 0.51  
Tenure 0.50-0.74 0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 0.00 0.00 $0 $0 0 0.00 
Tenure>=0.7S 2,60S $24,099 $129,1 1 S  $12,337 ($38,475) $320,708 0.82 1 .00 $21 3,323 $43,529 420 0.60 
* Tenure refers to the percentage of operated acres owned by the operator 
Table 1 6. Means of Variables of Interest for Tennessee in 2000 With and Without Government Payments for Solvency Classes 
I and II 
All Fanns Producing Value of 
more than $ I 000 in Value of Crop Livestock Government Net Fann Households Fann Net Off Fann Debt to 
Croe: N Production Production P�ents lnco,ne Total Debt Tenure Involved Worlh Income Acres As.set 
Solvency Ous I 
Total 16,447 $44,895 $12,353 $5,169 $25,127 $20,242 0.74 1 . 12 $463,903 $42,989 28 1 0.04 
Tenure <0.25 3,364 $S2,976 $12,234 $7,800 $3 1,122 $ 1 1 ,062 0. 10 1 .00 $319,851 $37,5 16 406 0.04 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 540 $167,601 $98,205 $44,046 $70,876 $1 50,606 0.35 1 .58 $828,536 $43,683 1 , 1 10 0 . 16 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 1,909 $21,816 $24,516 $3,812 $14,485 $14,702 0.69 1 .4 1  $329,2 19 $25,441 329 0.01 
Tenure >=0.75 10,655 $40, 185 $6,3 1 5  $3,554 $22,927 $1 7,805 0.97 1 .08 $511,569 $47,927 191 0.03 
Solvency Oass I Without Government Payments 
Total 16,187 $40,859 $12,059 $4,644 $20,068 $16,703 0.75 1 . 1 0  $461 ,663 $43,209 260 0.03 
--...J Tenure <0.25 3,303 $48,581 $12,460 $6,01 5  $24,386 $8,233 0. 10 1 .00 $3 16,656 $38,148 386 0.03 --...J 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 379 $96,962 $137,891 $33,017 $48,703 $103,247 0.37 1 . 1 5  $1,016,271 $42,745 835 0. 10 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 1,898 $21,702 $22,729 $3,643 $10,846 $14,763 0.69 1 .4 1  $3 16,981 $25,589 328 0.01 
Tenure >=0.75 10,628 $39,813 $5,998 $3,402 $19,440 $16,883 0.97 1 .08 $515,332 $48,046 188 0.03 
Solvency Oass II 
Total 7,683 $26,559 $6,1 1 1  $6,051 ($1 1 ,933) $20,398 0.70 1 .01 $379,172 $37,504 214 0.05 
Tenure <0.25 1,985 $85,307 $3,633 $1 7,354 ($26,994) $45,076 0,07 1 .03 $214,165 $43,612 452 0. 1 1  
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 38 $13,956 $96,491 $1 3,612 ($89,678) $1 5,71 7  0.34 1 .00 $1,480,659 $2,796 519 0.04 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 505 $41,751 $7,322 $1 ,054 ($19,323) $30,046 0.56 1 .00 $712,871 $20,3 17 264 0.04 
Tenure >=0.75 5,155 $2,543 $6,281 $2,132 ($4,837) $9,985 0.96 1 .00 $397,163 $37,267 1 16 0.03 
Solvency Oass II Without Government Payments 
7,943 $35,384 $6,9 1 5  $8,335 ($18,208) $27,605 0.69 1 .04 $386,607 $37,234 260 0.06 
Tenure <0.25 2,046 $91,438 $3,524 $19,950 ($44,047) $48,630 0.07 1 .03 $223,085 $42,323 483 0.12 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 199 $272,795 $22,295 $59,240 ($39,675) $215,043 0.32 2.29 $595,5 1 7  $37,663 1 ,519 0.25 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 516 $41 ,744 $14,263 $1,735 ($20,349) $29,494 0.56 1 .00 $749,708 $19,884 270 0.04 
Tenure >=0.75 5,182 $3,501 $6,932 $2,451 ($6,969) $1 1,918 0.96 1 .01 $402,322 $37,081 123 0.03 
* Tenure refers to the percentage of operated acres owned by the operator 
Table 1 6  continued 
All Farms Producing Value of 
more than $1000 in Value o/Crop Livestock Government Net Farm Households Farm Net Off Farm Debt to 
Crof!:!. N Production Production P�ents Income Total Debt Tenure Involved Worth Income Acres Asset 
Solvency Oass III 
Total 307 $45,498 $105,3 1 5  $6,445 $55,930 $162,956 0.3 1 1 .00 $99,7 17 $41 ,260 171  0.95 
Tenure <0.25 212 $39,373 $2,639 $4,532 $49,595 $42, 129 0.00 1 .00 ($5,483) $42,533 162 1 . 1 2  
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 0.00 0.00 $0 $0 0 0.00 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 0.00 0.00 $0 $0 0 0.00 
Tenure >=0.75 95 $59,165 $334,445 $ 10,7 1 5  $70,067 $432,591 1 .00 1 .00 $334,477 $38,421 1 89 0.55 
Solvency Oass III Without Government Payments 
Total 307 $45,498 $105,3 1 5  $6,445 $49,485 $162,956 0.3 1  1 .00 $99,71 7  $41,260 171 0.95 
Tenure <0.25 212 $39,373 $2,639 $4,532 $45,063 $42, 129 0.00 1 .00 ($5,483) $42,533 162 1 . 1 3  
-....J Tenure 0.25 -0.49 0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 0.00 0.00 $0 $0 0 0.00 
00 Tenure 0.50-0.74 0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 0.00 0.00 $0 $0 0 0.00 
Tenure >=-0. 7 5 95 $59,165 $334,445 $10,71 5  $59,352 $432,591 1 .00 1 .00 $334,477 $38,421 1 89 0.55 
Solvency Oass IV 
Total 266 $96,427 $ 1 1 6,057 $25,743 ($43,859) $454,73 1 0.4 1 1 .21  $1 ,597 $29,3 1 5  44 1 1 .52 
Tenure <0.25 39 $316,633 $95,000 $57,973 ($23,561) $273,019  0. 14 1 .00 $296,500 $1 ,4 17  1 ,297 0.47 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 177 $73,924 $0 $25,913 ($55,381)  $530,3 19  0.37 1 .32 ($138,825) $35,975 358 2.03 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 0.00 $0 $0 0 0.00 
Tenure >=-0.75 
Solvency Oass IV Without Government Payments 
Total 266 $96,427 $1 16,057 $25,743 ($69,602) $454,73 1 0.4 1 1 .21 $1,597 $29,3 1 5  441 1 .52 
Tenure <0.25 39 $3 16,633 $95,000 $57,973 ($81,534) $273,019  0. 14 1 .00 $296,500 $1 ,417 1 ,297 0.47 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 177 $73,924 $0 $25,913 ($81 ,295) $530,3 19  0.37 1 .32 ($ 138,825) $35,975 358 2.03 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 0.00 0.00 $0 $0 0 0.00 
Tenure >=0.75 
* Unable to report due to risk of disclosure 
** Tenure refers to the percentage of operated acres owned by the operator 
Table 17. Means of Variables of lnterest for Iowa in 2003 With and Without Government Payments for Solvency Classes I and 
II 
All Farms Producing Value of 
more than $1000 in Value of Crop Livestock Government Net Farm Households Farm Net Operator Off Debt to 
Crof!:!. N Production Production P'!.f!!!.ents Income Total Debt Tenure Involved Worth Farm Income Acres Asset 
Solvency Oass I 
Total 31 ,581 $1 13,905 $61 ,5 18 $13,400 $72,024 $95,7 13  0.61 1 .32 $731 ,747 $13, 134 553 0.09 
Tenure <0.25 7,783 $235,3 1 8  $8 1 , 1 85 $22,326 $1 1 1 ,298 $122,208 O.Q7 l .72 $552,798 $10,521 966 0. 13  
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 5,524 $139,039 $86,424 $16,879 $80,633 $ 175, 187 0.37 1 .23 $858,576 $1 1 ,639 68 1 0. 14 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 5,649 $1 16, 174 $76,642 $16,219 $84,227 $137,465 0.59 1 .33 $866,948 $10,567 634 0. 1 1  
Tenure >=0.75 15,921 $44,461 $37,939 $6,805 $45,079 $41 ,644 0.97 1 . 16 $728,8 16 $1 5,574 280 0.05 
--....J Solvency Oass I Without Government Payments 
Total 30,3 12 $109,004 $67,561 $12,424 $68,223 $90,373 0.61 1 .37 $723,379 $12,983 534 0.09 
Tenure <0.25 6,951 $204,808 $90,1 39 $19,835 $102, 188 $101,300 0.06 1 .79 $505,939 $10,866 845 0. 12 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 4,637 $143,077 $98,847 $17,061 $77,736 $175,489 0.35 1 .27 $890,975 $9,871 720 0. 15  
Tenure 0.50-0.74 4,840 $1 18,603 $85,496 $15,649 $80,552 $143,1 16 0.60 1 .37 $873, 136 $10, 1 88 646 0. 1 1  
Tenure>=0.75 14,180 $47,089 $40,061 $6, 166 $43,602 $40,720 0.97 1 . 1 8  $727,341 $1 5,721 284 0.05 
Solvency Class II 
Total 1 1 ,435 $98,764 $33,336 $1 1 ,233 ($35, 138) $92,374 0.54 1 .36 $63 1 ,625 $1 5,805 501 0. 1 3  
Tenure <0.25 3,718 $141 ,369 $1 8,342 $ 1 1 ,786 ($35,812) $96,994 0.08 1 .23 $437,23 1 $1 8,934 568 0. 18 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 1,758 $138,745 $62,097 $12,633 ($37,545) $181 ,694 0.34 1 .08 $749,670 $17,417  742 0. 17  
Tenure 0.50-0.74 2,036 $64,478 $57,942 $1 1 ,670 ($49,080) $139,393 0.64 1 . 14 $823,530 $1 2,793 507 0. 1 5  
Tenure >=0.75 4,135 $60,424 $21 ,502 $10, 1 1 9  ($26,583) $32,836 0.97 1 .68 $649,624 $13,451 332 0.06 
Solvency Oass II Without Government Payments 
Total 15,704 $1 12,341 $29,335 $13,706 ($36,359) $103,589 0.56 1 .27 $675,541 $1 5,376 552 0. 12  
Tenure <0.25 4,550 $205,1 59 $16, 1 53 $17,5 19 ($42,8 1 5) $ 133,546 0.09 1 . 19 $533,706 $16,939 825 0. 17 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 2,645 $131 ,763 $48,477 $13,737 ($36,482) $178,982 0.37 1 .05 $729,724 $1 8,560 653 0. 14 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 2,845 $75,047 $48,198 $13,933 ($45,478) $129,231 0.62 1 . 13 $825,349 $1 2,805 522 0. 14 
Tenure >=0.75 5,876 $49,350 $21 ,25 1 $10,678 ($27,344) $37,675 0.97 1 .47 $677,298 $1 3,734 306 0.06 * 
Tenure refers to the percentage of operated acres owned by the operator 
Table 17  continued 
All Fanns Producing Value of 
more than $1000 in Value of Crop Livestock Government Net Farm Households Farm Net Operator Off Debt to 
Crof!!. N Production Production Payments Income Total Debt Tenure Involved Worth Farm Income Acres Asset 
Solvency Oass m 
Total 2,591 $136,449 $213,520 $19,8 10  $108,795 $445,744 0.3 1 1 .08 $381 ,561 $10,375 646 0.55 
Tenure <0.25 1,388 $196,326 $195, 19 1  $22,650 $107,068 $309,676 0.02 1 . 14 $254,349 $1 1 ,267 808 0.56 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 486 $84, 153 $497,889 $28,707 $233,254 $884,920 0.34 1 .00 $659,779 $12,53 1 788 0.63 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 190 $36,437 $126,300 $10,973 $53,925 $656,460 0.74 1 .00 $461,834 $4,033 239 0.64 
Tenure>=0.75 592 $57,865 $54,019 $8,771 $20,821 $365,788 0.89 1 .00 $468,772 $7,539 255 0.45 
00 Solvency Class III Without Government Payments 
Total 2,461 $132,572 $202,782 $19,023 $94,463 $443,926 0.33 1 .07 $390,083 $10,950 634 0.55 
Tenure <0.25 1,258 $194,928 $172,291 $21,404 $94,663 $292,059 0.02 1 . 1 3  $257,089 $12,431 801 0. 55 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 486 $84,1 53 $497,889 $28,707 $204,547 $884,920 0.34 1 .00 $659,779 $12,531 788 0.63 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 190 $36,437 $ 126,300 $10,973 $42,95 1 $656,460 0.74 1.00 $461 ,834 $4,033 239 0.64 
Tenure >=0.75 592 $57,865 $54,019 $8,771 $12,051 $365,788 0.89 1 .00 $468,772 $7,539 255 0.45 
Solvency Oass IV 
Total 3,003 $80,490 $1 10,849 $9,549 ($38,167) $325,961 0.27 1 .02 $1 17,882 $9,984 439 1 . 1 1 
Tenure <0.25 2,041 $87,072 $1 1 3,783 $7,581 ($33,908) $228,271 0.02 1 .00 $69,488 $4,749 466 1 .32 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 216 $88,052 $336,260 $1 5,321 ($54,558) $1 , 1 16, 178 0.29 1 .24 ($200,684) $0 552 1 .06 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 73 $238,852 $0 $43,501 ($21 1 ,047) $609,91 8  0.63 1 .00 $546,966 $0 849 0.53 
Tenure >=0.75 673 $40,924 $41,630 $9,984 ($27,069) $337,802 0.99 1 .00 $3 16,966 $29,784 274 0.55 
Total N 
Solvency Oass IV Without Government Payments 
Total 3,133.00 $85,858 $123,544 $1 0,593 ($46,347) $332,359 0.26 1 .03 $122,5 1 3  $9,564 457 1 .09 
Tenure <0.25 2, 17 1  $94,424 $131 ,927 $9,205 ($39,886) $243,354 0.02 1 .01 $79, 179 $4,458 491 1 .28 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 216 $88,052 $336,260 $1 5,321 ($69,878) $1,1 1 6, 178 0.29 1 .24 ($200,684) $0 552 1 .06 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 
Tenure >=0.75 673 $40,924 $41,630 $9,984 ($37,054) $337,802 0.99 1 .00 $3 16,966 $29,784 274 0.55 
* Unable to report due to risk of disclosure 
** Tenure refers to the percentage of operated acres owned by the operator 
Table 18. Means of Variables of Interest for Tennessee in 2003 With and Without Government Payments for Solvency Classes 
I and II 
All Farms Producing Value of 
more than $ 1000 in Value o/Crop livestock Government Net Farm Households Farm Net Operator Off Debt to 
Crol! N Production Production P'!l!!!.ents Income Total Debt Tenure Involved Worth Farm Income Acres Asset 
Solvency Oass I 
Total 9,357 $89,269 $ 16,889 $5,247 $47,370 $35,379 0.67 1 . 1 2  $557,138 $9,548 326 0.03 
Tenure <0.25 2,731 $136,726 $19,612 $8,983 $75,162 $40,057 0. 14 1 .07 $280,041 $514 388 0.06 
Tenure 0.25 --0.49 597 $359,767 $16,743 $1 9,556 $ 172,692 $1 56,139 0.37 1 . 1 3  $1 , 148,852 $7, 1 14 1,258 0.07 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 1 ,003 $135,275 $21,935 $8,856 $46,363 $91 ,277 0.61 1 .45 $708,628 $4,529 5 10  0.05 
Tenure >=0.75 5,218 $26,1 1 3  $ 14,223 $1 ,07 1 $ 19, 120 $10,271 0.99 1 .08 $605,85 1  $ 1 5,9 12 164 0.01 
00 Solvency Oass I Without Government Payments - Total 9,262 $88,082 $16,563 $4,812  $42,762 $34,485 0.67 1 . 12 $552,074 $9,646 320 0.03 
Tenure <0.25 2,698 $134, 1 39 $ 18, 139 $8,355 $67,322 $38,61 1 0. 14 1 .05 $273,877 $520 375 0.05 
Tenure 0.25 --0.49 554 $381,340 $18,043 $19,5 13 $166,3 1 5  $ 168,062 0.37 1 . 1 4  $ 1 , 183,038 $7,666 1,325 0.07 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 984 $133,354 $22,359 $7,328 $38,542 $86,633 0.61 1 .46 $678,099 $4,616 501 0.04 
Tenure >=O. 75 5,218 $26, 1 1 3  $ 14,223 $1 ,070 $1 8,050 $10,271 0.99 1 .08 $605,851 $ 15,912 164 0.01 
Solvency Oass 11 
Total 3,496 $26,645 $6,874 $1,643 ($10,087) $4,41 9  0.97 1 .01  $500,838 $195 1 3 1  0.01 
Tenure <0.25 91 $234,260 $94,231 $27,007 ($133,554) $1 14,890 0.07 1 . 1 8  $607,6 16 $ 1,236 1 , 180 0. 1 1  
Tenure 0.25 --0.49 6 $680,034 $35,360 $79,878 ($236,4 1 1 ) $286,684 0.42 1 .00 $2,456,797 $2,083 2,232 0. 1 4  
Tenure 0.50--0.74 41 $587,268 $83,268 $63,937 ($130,365) $57,774 0.64 1 .88 $3,067,105 $2,134 2,8 15  0.01 
Tenure >=0.75 3,365 $14,436 $3,5 16  $367 ($4,909) $288 1 .00 1 .00 $470,394 $139 70 0.00 
Solvency Oass II Without Government Payments 
Total 3,591 $3 1 ,362 $7,980 $2,860 ($1 1 ,955) $7,542 0.96 1 .03 $5 1 5,387 $ 190 1 52 0.01 
Tenure <0.25 124 $264,589 $106,442 $35,882 ($ 125,108) $126,437 0. 1 0  1 .5 1  $654,450 $907 1,258 0. 12 
Tenure 0.25 --0.49 49 $155,081 $4,330 $27,423 ($53,343) $37,321 0.44 1 .00 $922,487 $255 628 0.02 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 60 $475,653 $56,900 $71,557 ($137,864) $144,536 0.63 1 .60 $2,820,940 $1,458 2,239 0.05 
Tenure >=0.75 3,365 $ 14,436 $3,5 16  $367 ($5,276) $288 1 .00 1 .00 $470,394 $139 70 0.00 
* Tenure refers to the percentage of operated acres owned by the operator 
Table 1 8  continued 
All Farms Producing Value of 
more than $1000 in Value of Crop Livestock Government Net Farm Households Farm Net Operator Off Debt to 
Crof!!. N Production Production P2f!!_ents Income Total Debt Tenure Involved Worth Farm Income Acres Asset 
Solvency Gass III 
Total 142 $599,492 $5,037 $3 1,100 $171 ,969 $419,236 0.46 2.04 $324,7 16 $5,413 1 ,383 0.54 
Tenure <0.25 72 $859,198 $9,935 $60,809 $212,736 $669,080 0.07 1 .57 $533,598 $10,675 2,61 1 0.62 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 0.00 0.00 $0 $0 0 0.00 
Tenure >=0.75 54 $370,093 $0 $704 $ 134,739 $69,213 1 .00 2.96 $48,915 $0 57 0.41 
Solvency Gass III Without Government Payments 
Total 106 $540,850 $6,748 $19,404 $205,796 $260,927 0.58 2.39 $194,851 $4,280 1 ,037 0.50 
Tenure <0.25 36 $946,233 $19,869 $56,079 $354, 161 $452,788 0.04 2. 14 $360,099 $12,601 2,820 0.58 
00 Tenure 0.25 -0.49 
N Tenure 0.50-0.74 0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 0.00 0.00 $0 $0 0 0.00 
Tenure >=0.75 54 $370,093 $0 $703 $134,035 $69,213 1 .00 2.96 $48,915 $0 57 0.41 
Solvency Gass IV 
Total 54 $369,336 $0 $1 ,794 ($148,998) $189, 133 0.69 2.96 $35, 1 1 4  $0 122 0.71 
Tenure <0.25 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 0.00 0.00 $0 $0 0 0.00 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 
Tenure >=0.75 0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 0.00 0.00 $0 $0 0 0.00 
Solvency Oass IV Without Government Payments 
Total 90 $530,467 $0 $27,292 ($1 10,598) $467,628 0.45 2. 1 8  $303,907 $3,500 1 ,034 0.69 
Tenure <0.25 37 $788,973 $0 $66,386 ($60,737) $881,205 0. 1 0 1 .00 $675,296 $8,5 14 2,444 0.71 
Tenure 0.25 -0.49 
Tenure 0.50-0.74 
Tenure >=0.75 0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 0.00 0.00 $0 $0 0 0.00 * 
Unable to report due to risk of disclosure 
** Tenure refers to the percentage of operated acres owned by the operator 
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